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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. This report provides a political economy analysis of the education sector in Nepal. 
Political Economy Analysis (PEA) is ‘concerned with the interaction of political and 
economic processes in society: the distribution of power and wealth between different 
groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these 
relationships over time.’1
 
 The purpose of this particular study was to understand how 
political and economic factors affect the implementation of the School Sector Reform 
Plan (SSRP) 2009-15.  
2. The study was commissioned by the Delegation of the European Union to Nepal. The 
international consultants were funded by DFID and the EC and the findings will also 
inform a larger EC PEA study of education in a number of countries. Funding for the 
national consultants was provided by UNICEF and transport during field studies was 
provided by the World Food Programme (WFP) and Rural Reconstruction Nepal (RNN). 
 
3. Nepal has experienced a number of significant political changes since the signing of a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006 which brought to an end the decade-
long ‘People’s War’. The ending of the monarchy led to multi-party elections in 2008 and 
has seen the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN-M) elected as the 
largest political party in a new Constituent Assembly tasked with drafting a new 
Constitution. This process has been delayed by serious problems notably federalism and 
the future of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Interim governments have 
remained weak and divided, with the result that progress on implementation of the CPA 
has been slow.            
 
4. Education policy has been developed within this uncertain and changing political context. 
The SSRP was developed by the Ministry of Education (MoE) as a long-term plan to 
improve the quality of basic and secondary education. It builds on previous programmes 
such as Education For All (EFA), the Secondary Education Support Program (SESP), 
and Teacher Education Project (TEP). The cost of the SSRP over the first five years was 
estimated to be $2.6 billion. The Government of Nepal has committed over $2 billion and 
development partners have pledged $0.5 billion. However, the status of the SSRP 
remains unclear as it has not been enacted into law.  
 
5. The SSRP has a number of elements, including reforms to the structure of schooling and 
movement towards decentralised management of schools, changes to the training, 
recruitment and professional development of teachers, and a range of measures to 
increase equitable access and participation. Although the Ministry of Education is 
seeking to push forward with the SSRP the necessary amendment to the Education Act 
has not yet been approved by the government and so its status remains unclear. In 
addition the education sector suffers from structural problems which inhibit the 
development and implementation of new policies. A reason for this PEA study is that, 
‘There is increasing recognition that blockages for effective reform at the sector level 
(including for delivery, planning and procurement) can be political and that technical 
                                                          
1 See www.oecd.org/dac/governance/politicaleconomy 
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solutions alone may not be enough.’ (Joint Donor Workshop DFID, EC, UNDP, World 
Bank, 2009). ‘Political’ here means not only top-level political contention but also the 
interests of actors at different levels, including teachers. 
 
6. The literature suggests that PEA can be conducted at three levels (macro-level country 
analysis, sector-level analysis and problem-driven analysis) but these need to be brought 
together and related to each other. This study accordingly seeks to integrate three levels 
of analysis. The macro-level analysis uses the DFID Strategic Conflict Analysis 
methodology to identify the dominant political economy drivers in Nepal. The education 
sector analysis identifies structural issues, institutions and actors operating within the 
sector from a political economy perspective and how these influence policy 
implementation. The third level is problem-based analysis2
 
  based on intensive 
engagement with a range of stakeholders to identify obstacles to progress in the sector 
generally and in the SSRP.  
7. There are a range of methodological challenges associated with this approach, not least 
the sensitive and often hidden nature of the information being sought. The approach is 
dependent on a highly developed understanding of political context and the interpretation 
of perceptions and motivations of various agencies and actors. The main method for 
achieving a balanced view has been through triangulation of information among many 
different stakeholders (and within the study team) and focusing on interests that might 
cause biases in the information being given. 
 
8. The initial plan was to focus on three specific areas of SSRP policy. These were 
governance (political influence, decentralisation, school management committees); 
identify factors (gender, language, inclusion of indigenous groups); and teachers 
(training, recruitment, employment and professional development). Whilst these were 
indeed important issues from a political economy perspective, it soon became clear that 
the use of more open-ended questions about perceptions of educational changes had a 
number of advantages. In particular, it meant that respondents were able to identify the 
issues they considered most relevant. With a focus on fundamental issues and interests, 
the study was drawn towards a wider assessment of the education sector rather than a 
narrow focus on the SSRP. 
 
9. The study was completed in three phases (January-March 2011) followed by a period of 
consultation and feedback. Phase 1 was a desk-based study of the political economy of 
Nepal (macro-analysis) and a preliminary description of the education sector (sector 
analysis). Phase 2 was a process of corroboration and deepening the analysis with 
stakeholders in Kathmandu and focusing the questions for field research. Phase 3 
involved field work in each of the five development regions of Nepal (Central, Eastern, 
West, Mid-West and Far-West). The initial draft was shared with officials from the 
Ministry of Education and their feedback has helped to provide a more rounded report.  
 
10. Field visits were made to 27 schools (21 government and 6 private) across 10 Districts: 
Kathmandu and Dhanusha (in the eastern Terai), Sankhuwasabha (in the eastern hills), 
                                                          
2 World Bank (2009) Problem-driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis 
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Kapilvastu and Rupandehi (in the western region), Banke and Rolpa (in the mid-western 
region where the armed conflict originated), Dadheldura and Kailali Districts (in the far 
west, the most remote and impoverished region). Altogether the study involved 
consultations with approximately 50 people during meetings in Kathmandu and 225 
stakeholders during the field visits. 
 
SUMMARY OF RECENT POLITICAL HISTORY 
11. The Maoist political group withdrew from democratic politics in 1996 and launched a 
‘People’s War’ starting from remote rural areas and drawing on the grievance of very 
poor and excluded people, including a high proportion of women. By 2006 the situation 
had reached a stalemate in which the Maoists largely controlled the rural areas and the 
government held the towns. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement led to a new interim 
Constitution and election of a Constituent Assembly tasked with drawing up a permanent 
Constitution. The Maoists emerged as the strongest political force but without an overall 
majority. The monarchy had become unpopular following a ‘royal massacre’ in 2001 and 
was abolished but the three main political parties have not been able to provide stable 
government. Instead, short-term rent-seeking and patronage politics have increased.   
MAIN FINDINGS 
12. The macro analysis highlights the importance of political patronage as the main political 
economy factor influencing the development of education in Nepal. This is particularly 
pervasive in Nepal because of a continuing history of centralisation of power. Efforts to 
promote the ‘forms’ of governance are often outweighed by hidden political pressures 
(‘informal governance’) and efforts to promote decentralisation are thwarted by 
centralising tendencies. There has been some improvement in relation to direct social 
exclusion but patronage systems (or ‘informal governance’) create less visible barriers to 
social mobility, leading to frustration and inefficiency.  
 
13. Geopolitical factors relating to the rivalry of India and China make it unlikely that there 
will be any significant change from the current situation of weak government. India, in 
particular, often switches its support between political actors in order to ensure that no 
strong government emerges to challenge its hegemony. The political parties remain 
focused on internal competition and have done little to develop policies on issues such 
as education. This has not weakened the control of central institutions but has led to a 
kind of national paralysis. At local and District levels, elections have not taken place 
since the last elected bodies expired in 2002. Functions are performed solely by 
government officials who often come under the influence and control of the political 
parties. But local voices and opinions are excluded because the parties operate on the 
basis of their centrally-controlled national strategies, ignoring the needs of local people. 
 
14. Education Overview. From almost no education system in the 1950s, Nepal has 
developed an extensive network of schools now reaching practically all areas 
(approximately 33,000 primary schools with nearly 5m students and nearly 8,000 
secondary schools with nearly 1.2m students in 2010). Many of these schools are very 
small and in very remote locations, making the issue of teacher deployment difficult and 
sensitive. Unfortunately, government control over teachers is minimal. The affiliation of 
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teachers to political unions protects them from control by schools and the Ministry. This 
results in lack of discipline. Irregular attendance, absenteeism and unwillingness to cover 
for other teachers often cause students to miss their studies. Attempts by Head 
Teachers to control teachers are likely to be treated as political.  
 
15. Political links with teachers open the way for direct political interference and competition 
in schools. The local appointment of teachers is a particularly sensitive issue with each 
party seeking to put forward its own candidates. Since the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), School Management Committees have become highly politicised, 
especially in the Terai (plains), and political parties have mobilised support for elections 
to these bodies around their own narrow interests rather than education policies and 
objectives. As a result, government schools are much less efficient than private schools 
and there is a danger of a deepening social divide between private and public educated 
children.  
 
16. Positive Achievements. Despite these problems enrolment rates for government 
schools have increased dramatically (from 81% in 2000 to 93.7% in 2010). In particular, 
the rate of girls’ enrolment is now equal with that of boys and Nepal is now reasonably 
close to achieving MDGs in relation to formal education. This is remarkable in a society 
with sharply-divided gender roles. To an extent this success is tempered by an 
increasing number of boys going to private schools, indicating that parents prefer to 
‘invest’ in boys rather than girls. Secondly the retention and final exam success rates for 
girls are much less impressive, indicating that girls are often withdrawing from school 
early, especially in the terai (plains). A further major achievement is that social 
discrimination on caste lines has considerably decreased. These successes reflect 
efforts and changes within the education sector but are also attributable, in part at least, 
to pressures from the Maoist movement (which enlisted large numbers of girls/women 
and cadres from socially excluded groups (notably dalits). 
  
17. Teachers and Teaching. The current rigidity in deployment of permanent teachers is 
the key weakness of the government school system and the situation is protected by 
unions and political parties. Teachers who are centrally employed enjoy security of 
employment and pension rights that create a sense of impunity for their actions in terms 
of accountability to local populations. This is reflected in high levels of teacher 
absenteeism, poor timekeeping and the common practice of teachers having second 
jobs. Many of the older permanent teachers are now ineffective and demoralised. 
Although they may appear to enjoy an easy protected life, politicisation causes deep 
division within schools and teachers may feel that they have lost respect from students 
and communities. Schools face a particularly serious shortage of teachers of Science, 
Maths and English and these are the subjects that students are most likely to fail in the 
School Leaving Certificate (SLC) examination. Although Head Teachers are limited in 
their ability to manage teachers by unionisation, there are examples of outstanding Head 
Teachers who exert control through their own charisma and hard work. Some of the best 
government schools offer a very high standard of education, and not simply exam 
success. In short, it is not the formal system that undermines education but the informal 
pressures arising ultimately from patronage and politicisation. 
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18. Education Standards and Examinations. Development Partners in Nepal make a 
significant financial contribution through the Education Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). 
They use a number of measures as key indicators of progress, notably enrolment of 
girls, as noted above. However, all such statistics are prone to manipulation around the 
interests of elements within the education system. In particular, SMC Chairpersons and 
Head Teachers have an interest in maintaining high numbers of students (at least in the 
records) in order to increase the Per Capita Funding. Examination success is also a key 
factor. In the case of Nepal this focuses on the SLC exam taken at the end of Grade 10. 
For at least a decade, cheating has been a feature of this exam and it now appears that 
this is taking place on a systemic basis, at least in some areas, encouraged by teachers 
and officials who feel pressurised to improve the SLC success rate.3
 
 This may be partly 
a result of pressures from DPs expressing concern about low pass rates. In 2005 and 
2006 only about a third of government school students passed the exam. Subsequently 
the pass rate rose dramatically to around two thirds and then in the current year fell back 
to less than half. Throughout this period DPs have continued to ask why returns on 
education investment in the government sector are so much lower than in the private 
sector.  
19. One way in which officials can adjust exam success rates is by allowing discretion in the 
case of near-passes. Processes of ‘liberal progression’ have been gradually extended 
allowing examiners to add more and more ‘grace marks’ to allow students to reach the 
level required for a pass. Another is to offer the opportunity to re-sit examinations for 
subjects that had been failed in the first round of exams. Both these methods have been 
used increasingly. In the case of exam re-takes the success rates are implausibly high, 
suggesting that distortions are particularly extreme in this practice and may involve a 
combination of cheating, mark upgrades and outright re-writing of the figures.  
 
20. A problem with institutionalised cheating is that it removes the incentives for effective 
learning both from teachers and students. There is a danger that the education system, 
while putting forward a vision of progress based on merit, actually promotes very 
negative stereotypes: a government job does not entail the need to work; working hard at 
studies brings less success than bribery etc. Ultimately the politicisation of the education 
system perpetuates itself by adjusting each new generation to the same system and 
reinforcing the power of ‘informal governance’ in society. 
 
21. Decentralisation. The implications for education of a new federalist Constitution remain 
unclear because the details of the arrangement remain highly contentious. One 
possibility is that the federal states would be based on ethnic and linguistic divisions, 
which may have profound implications for the role of languages in education. There is 
also uncertainty about what federalism would mean for political control of education, the 
governance of schools and authority over decision-making such as employment of 
teachers, content of the school curriculum and quality control of examinations and 
assessment. All these issues have profound political ramifications and may be hotly 
contested for a long time to come. This indicates that fundamental problems such as 
teacher deployment will not be addressed. 
                                                          
3 Mathma and Bista (2006) Study on Student Performance in SLC, Ministry of Education and Sports –Education 
Sector Advisory Team, Kathmandu  
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22. The Role of District Education Officers (DEOs). The influence of political parties on 
education issues means that DEOs are in a difficult position. The fieldwork suggests that 
their time is preoccupied with responding to complaints, rather than taking a lead in 
implementation of education policy in the local district. Without an amendment to the 
Education Act, DEOs are reluctant to put much effort into implementation of the SSRP. 
DEOs have to sanction school finances and act as a central point in disbursement of 
government funds. Schools have an incentive to inflate the number of students in order 
to increase their grant-in-aid (Per Capita Funding). The monitoring and accountability 
functions of DEOs can become difficult or even dangerous. Because all such issues are 
politicised, DEOs may be under pressure to sanction malpractices rather than run into 
direct opposition to political parties that have strong links to the centre and perhaps to 
the Ministry. Similarly, political pressures make it difficult for DEOs to bring about quality 
improvements in schools. Teachers can refuse to take notice of DEOs, Supervisors and 
Resource Persons because of their political ‘protection’ through the unions.    
 
23. Private Schools. Remittances from migration (mainly to the Gulf States, Malaysia and 
India) are fuelling a trend towards private education based mainly on English medium. 
English-medium is viewed both as a status issue and as a route to more lucrative forms 
of employment (e.g. in aid agencies) or study abroad. The success of private schools 
derives primarily from stronger control of teachers by the school management. Political 
unions are usually kept out of the school. The qualifications and training of teachers and 
the quality of infrastructure may often be lower in private schools than in government 
schools but the pass rate in the crucial SLC exam is nearly twice as high (approximately 
90%). Both types of school use rote-learning methods but in private schools the teachers 
have much stronger incentives for exam success – otherwise they are likely to lose their 
job. Government school teachers have no such incentive because their jobs are secure 
and protected by the unions. Parents are more likely to engage with private schools than 
government schools but usually in relation to their own children rather than in general 
management. They treat education as an economic investment and may pursue different 
strategies in relation to different children.  It is widely argued that because education 
officials and teachers generally send their children to private schools they have less 
commitment to the public system. 
 
24. School Management Committees (SMCs). Although SMCs are supposed to be bodies 
elected from among parents and including representation of women and Dalits, our 
fieldwork indicates that the SMC is commonly dominated by the Chairperson, especially 
in the terai. This is not only because the Chairperson may prefer to act alone but also 
because historically public education has been viewed as a ‘gift’ from the state and 
parents often feel reluctant to question what they are given for nothing. In the schools 
that are managed by the communities, the SMC Chairperson in effect controls the school 
assets in collaboration with the Head Teacher although he (we found no case of ‘she’) 
may require sanction from the DEO on some issues. In particular, the SMC Chairperson 
plays an influential role in the appointment of locally-recruited teachers and with the rapid 
expansion of schools this has become a common practice. In the terai (plains) this has 
become one of the main reasons for seeking election as SMC Chair and leads to bitter 
and sometimes violent struggles. In more remote and less politicised hilly areas, social 
status may be a greater factor encouraging people to take up the onerous task of SMC 
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Chair and there are some cases of genuine philanthropists concerned to improve 
children’s education. 
 
25. Increased public demand for education together with the SSRP plan to extend basic 
(compulsory) education by three years to Grade 8 have made SMC Chair posts more 
and more powerful. In addition, there is increasing demand for Higher Secondary 
schools (Grades 11&12). All this adds to opportunities for teacher recruitment and 
infrastructure development. In many cases funds are provided by village and district level 
councils. Since these bodies are not democratic but run by officials, there is little 
transparency and accountability in relation to their decisions and this opens the way for 
the distortions of ‘informal governance’.  
 
26. The Role of Education in Identity Development. The demise of the monarchy has 
opened the way for greater recognition of diversity in religion and culture. The notion that 
Nepal’s diverse peoples had happily submitted to the ‘Hindu Kingdom’ could now be 
challenged and a discourse relating to historical and cultural suppression began to 
emerge. School textbooks have been revised to remove the worst stereotypes relating to 
history, religion and culture and respect for diversity is now included in the syllabus 
under the heading of Peace Education. 
 
27. Some leaders of indigenous ethnic groups favour the development of education in the 
‘mother tongue’ while others fear that it would isolate them from wider society. The 
debate has been given impetus by the commitment to federalism by the political parties 
and in the current Constitution. There is a possibility that federal states could be based 
on language groups other than Nepali and that those languages could be adopted as the 
language of instruction in schools. There is a danger that objective analysis and debate 
around the issue of ‘mother tongue’ may be overtaken by political arguments and by 
short-term concessions that could have serious consequences for the education system. 
 
28. Gender Issues. As noted above, the enrolment of girls in public education has 
significantly improved but drop-out rates remain high. There is a risk that the DP focus 
on MDGs, coupled with scholarships and other incentives from aid agencies,4
 
 may be 
causing a distortion in the system. It is reported that girls sometimes enrol for several 
different schools in order to collect the scholarships. This may undermine the value of 
education. The importance of women as role models in schools has received much less 
attention from DPs. Although the proportion of women teachers now approaches a third, 
they are invariably placed in lower classes of Primary schools and are very rare in higher 
classes. Female Head Teachers are an extreme rarity even though studies indicate that 
girls do better under women teachers.  
  
                                                          
4 Notably, WFP provides cooking oil for girls enrolling. To a lesser extent the same problems also apply in case 
of incentives for dalits and other disadvantaged groups  
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS 
29. The General Role of Development Partners. In a context in which ‘informal 
governance’ often drives out ‘formal governance’ it is important not only for DPs to 
support and encourage formal educational governance (as laid down in the regulations) 
but also to root out and challenge distortions that arise from personal and political 
interests. Although this requires considerable tact and diplomacy and may sometimes 
appear confrontational, such an approach may be welcomed by officials who are caught 
in the grip of a politicised patronage system.   
 
30. As a fundamental prerequisite of such an approach DPs must equip themselves with 
reliable and independent sources of information. Unfortunately the official sources are 
unreliable because they become distorted by the effects of incentives. In particular there 
is a tendency to inflate figures for students attending school in order to increase funds for 
scholarships and the Per Capita Funding. Until 2006 the DPs operated an independent 
monitoring system that provided a cross-check on official data and this helped DPs to 
identify real problems in the system. But in 2007 the DPs discontinued this activity, 
apparently on the basis that there was no significant difference in the figures for that 
year. There had been considerable differences in the previous years and this decision 
seems to have been taken hastily. Political Economy Analysis indicates that official data 
is bound to be affected by hidden factors and therefore it is absolutely essential to have 
an independent check. 
  
31. Secondly, DPs should not allow themselves to be boxed into a corner by the dominance 
of the Paris Declaration principle of alignment with government, nor by their formal 
position of support to government within the Education SWAp. Nepal should still be 
regarded essentially as a ‘fragile state’ especially in terms of political turbulence, 
governance and the possibility of renewed violence and conflict. This should remain the 
mode of assistance at least until a new Constitution and directly elected government are 
installed. By implication, DPs should be ready to use a mixture of instruments, both state 
and non-state, to implement their programmes. In the absence of full democratic 
government at all levels there is still a considerable need for independent monitoring and 
support through capacity building. In the case of education, NGOs may still be needed to 
help develop parental involvement, to help SMCs to manage themselves and to 
intervene in disputes that may damage the education process. Above all, NGOs still 
need to play a role in ensuring that SMCs and Head Teachers are accountable to local 
people by, at a minimum, conducting ‘social audit’ processes.    
 
32. Thirdly, this PEA study shows the dangers of too much focus on specific targets at the 
expense of other aspects of the system. DP focus on enrolment rates, especially for 
girls, has drawn attention away from reasons why girls may drop out. The use of 
incentives such as scholarships and free food may produce changes in key statistics but 
may not bring about fundamental and sustainable change. 
 
33. Fourthly, DPs could do more to encourage debate among the political parties and 
challenge them to come up with policies to reduce the politicisation of schools. DPs 
should recognise that assistance through a SWAp mechanism entails a risk of handing 
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over patronage opportunities to the political entities in charge of education. This reached 
an extreme in the case of appointment of temporary teachers and DPs took effective 
action to limit abuses. Other negative practices that deserve direct and sustained DP 
attention are: 
• Imbalances in class sizes because of problems relating to deployment of teachers; 
• Systemic cheating in exams; 
• Reinstatement of local elections at village and district levels. 
Although DPs may like to argue that some of these issues are out of their control (or 
even of the Ministry of Education), the SWAp mechanism makes DPs responsible for the 
education system as a whole, not just specific technical aspects. 
 
34. Fifthly, DPs should insist that local elections should be held as the most realistic first step 
towards improvement of school management. Currently all the local political pressures 
centre on the school. If elected local governments resume functioning political debates 
will, to an extent at least, go back to their proper arena. This will also provide a proper 
mechanism for local oversight of schools and control of SMCs. Elected local government 
bodies are a prerequisite for decentralisation of education.  
   
35. Specific Issues in relation to the SSRP. Even though the SSRP lacks legal impetus, 
DPs can build on its positive agenda especially in relation to the following issues: 
 
• Monitoring of private schools. The SSRP makes little reference to private schools 
but the social divide between public and private education is a matter of considerable 
importance and deserves to be more closely followed both by government and DPs; 
 
• Payments in government schools. Government schools are increasingly engaged 
in fundraising activity both from local councils and from parents and local 
communities. Under the Constitution, basic education is to be provided free but this is 
not entirely realistic and could deter parents from involvement with the schools. 
Making a contribution encourages participation and helps to develop a sense of 
‘rights’. While DPs may be constrained by global commitments, they should avoid a 
strong push for ‘free public education’. This would acknowledge that until 
fundamental faults of the system (notably teacher deployment) are addressed, 
communities will have to adjust and manage as best they can; 
 
• Teacher performance. There is a substantial body of research that highlights the 
central role of school leadership and teacher effectiveness as the main factors 
contributing to improvements in the quality of education.5
 
 It appears that despite a 
high level of training and further regular training inputs, teachers rarely put the results 
into practice in the schoolroom; 
• The Role of examinations. It still appears that the examination system gives a 
premium to rote-learning and to that extent favours the private school approach. This 
undermines government schools and also reduces the quality of education in private 
                                                          
5 For an overview see Harris, A. and Muijs, D. (2011) Teacher Leadership: A Review of Research accessed at 
www.teachers.org.uk/files/word/t-leadership-review.doc  
A Political Economy Analysis of Education in Nepal 2011 
 
14 
 
schools. The incentives derived from the current examination system deserve further 
reappraisal; 
 
• Education in the ‘Mother Tongue’. DPs must be very careful about applying global 
lessons without taking account of the political forces surrounding this issue. There 
are strong reasons, relating to respect for diversity, for extending the provision of 
education in the ‘mother tongue’ and the teaching of local languages as a special 
subject. DPs must simply be careful that they do not get drawn into support of 
political forces in the absence of any firm national basis for taking this issue forward; 
 
• Education in English medium. There is an increasing practice of teaching in 
English medium in government schools. This is allowed by the regulations but has 
hitherto been quite rare. DPs should recognise that this may offer the chance to 
break down the increasing divide between government and private schools and to 
maintain government schools as the source of education for all social groups but this 
will not, of course, address the issue of quality education in government schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Political Economy Analysis of Education in Nepal 2011 
 
15 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Purpose and Process 
The Government of Nepal (GoN) has introduced a School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP) 2009-
2015. Although this is still not enacted in law it represents new directions in education with 
an extension of compulsory basic schooling and a strong emphasis on quality of education. 
It builds on from Nepal’s ‘Education For All’ (EFA) approach during the previous years. 
The objectives of the study, as stated in the Terms of Reference (see Annex 1), place the 
SSRP within a wider context. In summary they are to-   
1. Analyse the political, economic and social context into which the SSRP is being 
introduced and implemented; 
2. Map out stakeholder interests, power relations and decision-making at different levels; 
3. Identify obstacles to educational policies, programmes and reforms; 
4. Examine the role of development partners (DPs); 
5. Suggest ways of making improvements in the education sector. 
The study was completed in three phases. Phase 1 was a desk-based study of the political 
economy of Nepal (Macro-analysis) and a preliminary description of the education sector 
(Sector analysis). Phase 2 was a process of corroboration and deepening the analysis with 
stakeholders in Kathmandu and focusing the questions for field research. Phase 3 involved 
field work in selected Districts of Nepal. The process was iterative, so that results from the 
field work and Kathmandu consultations fed back into the initial desk-based study to make it 
sharper and more relevant. In parallel with this process the team has gathered together 
relevant documents which are now held on a web platform. 
Section One of this report presents the Macro-analysis. This examines the political economy 
of Nepal in a global context and draws primarily on published sources. It also draws on a 
series of unpublished political economy studies recently commissioned by DPs and covering 
the health, power, agriculture and police sectors. These have been brought together in a 
synthesis document (Jones, 2010). Because Nepal’s history and recent political 
developments are presented in these and many other documents we do not repeat them in 
the main text. Section One ends with a summary of points which are likely to have an impact 
on the education sector.  
Section Two provides a detailed analysis of the education sector, including key educational 
statistics. It examines key issues in the education sector and some of the essential elements 
and challenges of the SSRP 
Section Three presents the main outcome of the field studies in Nepal in the form of a 
problem-level analysis. This focuses particularly on what was observed to be happening in 
contrast with what might be expected according to formal policies and regulations.  
 
Section Four considers the role of Development Partners (DPs) and concludes with some 
options and possibilities for their future work. 
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Political Economy Analysis 
OECD (2008) defines Political Economy Analysis (PEA) as concerned with the interaction of 
political and economic processes in society: the distribution of power and wealth between 
different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these 
relationships over time.’6 PEA begins with a comprehensive review of the context and 
progress from this macro-level analysis downwards through sector-level analysis focused on 
institutions to ‘problem-driven’ analysis focused on the roles of individual agents within those 
institutions and structures.7 As DFID observes, ‘sector-level and problem-driven analysis 
pre-supposes that a satisfactory macro-analysis has been completed.’8
The macro-analysis in Section One uses the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) method 
devised by DFID
   
9
SCA method of mapping the structural causes of tension  
 both because this was suggested in the TOR and also because it presents 
a neutral, mapping approach which can be easily adapted to our ultimate focus on the 
Education Sector- 
 
Sector level analysis carried out with a focus on formal institutions and current policies. 
Education sector 
 
- History 
- Current Statistics 
- SSRP 
- Policy Issues 
Structures 
 
Factors 
Institutions (formal) 
 
Factors 
Actors 
 
Factors 
 
Both the World Bank10 and the DFID11 approaches to political economy analysis identify 
three kinds of drivers: structures, institutions and agents. According to DFID12
                                                          
6 See DFID (2009) p4. For a wider review of PEA methodologies see GSDRC (2008). 
, ‘structures’ 
are ‘long-term contextual factors....{which are}... not readily influenced.’ Most of the macro-
analysis falls into this category. The analysis of ‘Institutions’ focuses on the interests that 
drive institutions and (following DFID) these can be divided into ‘formal’ (what is supposed to 
happen) and ’informal’ (what really happens). The problem-driven analysis focuses on how 
these issues actually play out on the ground and through individual agents. The macro-
7 DFID (2009) p14 This has been vindicated in the current study: the impact of geopolitical factors can be 
clearly traced to the education sector  
8 DFID (2009) p8 
9 DFID (2002) 
10 World Bank (2009) see diagram on p42 
11 DFID (2009) see diagram on p9. The EC approach is consistent with this. See European Commission (2008). 
12 See DFID (2009) p9 
 Security  Political Economic Social 
International     
National     
District/Federal     
Local     
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analysis establishes a wider context of ‘formal governance’ versus ‘informal governance’ 
which is then reflected in the institutional and problem-driven analysis.  
The three levels of PEA (macro, sector and problem) correspond to some extent with a focus 
on structures, institutions and agents but it is the interaction of these different levels of 
analysis and types of actor that provides depth and nuance to the process. 
 
 
Methodological Challenges of the process in Nepal 
 
The SSRP has been underway since 2009 but it still lacks legal status, even though some of 
its provisions are being put into practice. This makes it difficult to maintain too tight a focus 
on the SSRP and leads to a wider focus on the education system as a whole. But this may 
also provide greater opportunities to influence the process as it moves forward. 
 
The literature highlights the sensitive nature of PEA. It attempts to make more explicit those 
factors that are part of an unofficial discourse and normally less visible. The study of 
‘informal governance’ leads into issues of patronage and corruption, as does the study of the 
role of individual agents within larger institutions. Staff may be constrained in analysing the 
institutions they work for in this way. In particular there are fears that negative impressions 
may tarnish the image of Nepal and that DPs may be persuaded to cut their assistance.  
 
This makes it difficult to conduct PEA studies in an open partnership with government but 
without the engagement of government the findings are less likely to take effect. In this case 
an initial draft report was shared with officials on an informal basis and their informal 
feedback was taken into account in the current revision. 
 
PEA is also highly dependent on the different perceptions of various stakeholders and 
actors, and for this reason it is extremely important to triangulate data to check for reliability 
and consistency of perceptions. The main challenges lie in the problem-level analysis. On a 
number of occasions, the researchers were asked to abstain from taking notes whenever the 
interviewees felt that they were providing sensitive information. In general, interviewees were 
willing to talk about distortions within the system, but avoided any direct criticism of 
government or government policy. On a more positive note, the comparison of areas and 
schools in the problem-driven analysis was helpful because it led directly into questions of 
why systems operate differently under different conditions. 
 
Finally it was important to avoid preconceptions and DP biases. Although meeting MDGs is 
a DP priority it should not detract from other concerns relating to the education system. 
Throughout this analysis we were careful to recognise that simply increasing the numbers of 
children registered or the quantity of educational inputs is not enough because education 
can have both positive and negative impacts.  
 
Schedule of Fieldwork 
In Nepal the first week (14-19 Feb 2011) was spent in meetings and interviews with 
development partners and stakeholder consultations. During this period two extended 
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consultation meetings were held. The first was a meeting with representatives of DPs and 
the second involved a presentation on SSRP by a representative of the Ministry of Education 
followed by group discussion with academics and representatives of local NGOs. Individual 
interviews were also held with representatives of political parties and development partners 
(ADB, UNICEF, World Bank). The second two weeks involved field visits. 
Nepal has five development Regions made up of 75 Districts. Field visits were made to the 
following districts in each region over a two-week period (21 Feb – 5 Mar 2011): 
1. Central Region. Kathmandu District includes the capital and has the highest 
concentration of private schools. Three schools were visited in Kathmandu district (2 
government and 1 private13
 
). In-depth interviews were carried out with the DEO (1), MoE 
officials (2), NCED officials (2), representatives of Teachers’ Unions (2), DPs (3) and 
SMC Chairs/ members (3). Formal meetings were held with head teachers (2), teachers 
(8) and students (25). Several informal meetings were also held with a number of 
individuals involved in the educational sector. 
2. Eastern Region. Dhanusha District (in the Terai) and Sankhuwasabha District (in the 
mountains) were visited. Three schools were visited in Dhanusha where head teachers 
(2), teachers (15), students (20), SMC Chairs/ members (6), university lecturer (1) and 
politicians (6) were interviewed. In Sankhuwasabha, a hill district with Rai and Limbu 
indigenous communities, three schools were visited (2 government, 1 private) plus a 
technical training centre with 40 students enrolled. During the school visits interviews, 
focus groups and less formal meetings were held with meetings were held with head 
teachers (3), teachers (20), students (12), SMC members (3), representatives of teacher 
unions (2) and DEO (1). 
 
3. Western Region. Kapilvastu and Rupandehi Districts were visited where meetings 
were held in three schools (2 government and 1 private) with head teachers (4), teachers 
(6), students (2), SMC Chair (2), DEOs (2) and politicians (3). 
 
4. Mid-Western Region. Rolpa is a mid-western hilly district where the armed conflict 
originated and Banke District was visited en route. Six schools were visited in Rolpa. 
 
5. Far-Western Region. Doti is a far western district remote from power and central 
politics. Dadheldura and Kailali Districts were visited en route. In the Far West and 
Mid-West the original plan was to focus on the hilly Districts of Rolpa and Doti 
respectively, but the scope of study was increased partly because of necessary travel 
through other Districts. In total, 15 schools (12 government and 3 private) were visited in 
these Districts (Doti 6, Dadheldhura 1, Kailali 2, Rolpa 6). Formal meetings were held 
with VDC Secretaries (2), DEOs (4), Resource Persons/Supervisors (2), SMC Chairs (5), 
head teachers/teacher groups (15), teacher unions (1), students (3), parents (2), INGOs 
(1-CARE), NGOs (4) and Development Partners (1, WFP). Many other meetings took 
place informally in tea shops and while travelling on the road.  
                                                          
13 Private schools are often referred to as ‘boarding’ schools although they do not actually provide boarding 
facilities. Government schools are commonly referred to as public schools. 
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Tejendra Pherali conducted the field work in Kathmandu, Kapilvastu, Dhanusha and 
Rupandehi Districts. In Dhanusha, Tejendra was accompanied by Louise Banham and Ajit 
Karna. Alan Smith travelled to Sankhuwasabha and was accompanied by Shradha 
Rayamajhi. In the West, Tony Vaux was accompanied by Yogendra Bijukchhen, a former 
teacher and head-teacher, for visits to Doti, Dadheldhura, Kailali and Banke Districts. For 
travel in Rolpa District he was then joined by Shradha Rayamajhi.   
In total 27 schools were visited (21 government and 6 private) across 10 Districts. Those 
interviewed are summarised below.  
 
In general the views of DEOs, SMC members, Head Teachers and Teachers are well 
represented in our study. It was more difficult to secure interviews with parents. Pupil voices 
were represented mostly in group discussion since it was often difficult to secure privacy for 
individual interviews without teachers present. This may have influenced the opinions that 
pupils felt free to express.  
Altogether the study involved consultations with approximately 50 people during meetings in 
Kathmandu and 225 stakeholders during the field visits.      
 
  
 Regions and Districts Visited During Fieldwork 
Region Central  Eastern Western Mid-West Far-West Totals 
Districts 
visitied 
  
Kathmandu  
 
Dhanusha 
Sankhuwasabha  
 
Kapilvastu 
Rupandehi 
 
Rolpa 
Banke 
 
Doti 
Dadheldura 
Kailali 
 
 
10 
Govt officials 4 - - 1 1 6 
DEOs  1 1 2 2 2 8 
Private 
schools 
1 1 1 1 2 6 
Govt schools 2 5 2 4 8 21 
SMC 
members 
3 9 2 2 3 19 
Teacher 
Unions 
2 2 - 0 1 5 
Head 
Teachers 
2 5 4 3 5 19 
Teachers 8 35 6 2 5 56 
Pupils 25 32 2 1 2 62 
Parents - - - - 2 2 
NGOs - - - 1 4 5 
Dev Partners 3 - - 1 - 1 
Others 2 7 3 1 2 13 
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Section One: Macro-level Analysis 
 
Key Factors relating to conflict and state fragility in Nepal 
Studies show considerable agreement about the fundamental factors contributing to conflict 
and state fragility in Nepal although there is rather less agreement about the relationship of 
these factors to each other and their relative importance. Using the Strategic Conflict 
Assessment (SCA) approach14
Table: Underlying Causes of Tension in Nepal -Summary  
 the factors are mapped out below and explained in the 
following sub-sections- 
 Security Political Economic Social 
 
International 
 
India/China tension 
 
India has an interest in 
weak governance in 
Nepal 
 
Aid through 
government may 
reinforce ‘informal 
governance’ 
 
Global influences 
increase the 
demand for rights 
and equality; 
 
National 
 
History of conflict; 
 
No process of truth 
and reconciliation; 
 
Continued presence 
of Maoist army; 
 
Weak police force 
and rule of law; 
 
Culture of impunity in 
relation to human 
rights; 
 
 
 
Weak government 
asserting centralised 
control; 
 
Dominance of 
informal 
governance 
(patronage 
systems) over 
formal 
governance; 
 
Politicised unions 
create inefficiency and 
exclusion; 
 
Wealth focused in 
Kathmandu; 
 
Political patronage 
extends into and 
constrains business 
sector;  
 
State services 
undermined because 
elite groups use 
private services; 
 
 
Private education 
and English 
language creates a 
class barrier 
affecting 
employment; 
 
 
 
District/Federal 
 
Emergence of armed 
groups in the terai 
and Eastern hills; 
 
Lack of elected 
representation in DDC 
and VDC; 
 
 
Difficult to start new 
businesses without 
patronage and 
political links; 
 
Ethnicity, caste, 
religion mobilised 
around federalism 
and political 
agendas; 
 
Local 
 
Spread of criminal 
violence; 
 
Use of direct action 
(bandhas etc);  
 
Politicisation of 
community-based 
organisations (SMCs, 
Community Forest 
Users’ Groups etc); 
 
Women excluded from 
involvement in local 
services; 
 
 
Local elite groups not 
involved in 
government services 
except for profit; 
 
 
 
 
Continued social 
exclusion against 
dalits, women and 
other marginalised 
groups;  
 
 
Note: The most important factors are in bold; those especially relevant to this study are in italics. 
                                                          
14 An SCA was first conducted in Nepal in 2000 and revised in 2002. The analysis became integrated into DFID 
Country Strategy from 2005.   
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1.1 Security Factors 
The security interests of the regional superpowers provide an overarching framework for 
Nepal, tending to prevent the emergence of strong and stable governments. In particular, 
India often switches its support between different entities, ensuring that none emerges with 
unquestioned power. An important implication for our study is that it would be unwise to base 
development planning in Nepal on the assumption that present difficulties will be quickly 
resolved and a strong, stable government will emerge. Instead weak government is likely to 
perpetuate ‘informal governance’ which is identified in our study as the key and fundamental 
factor determining development outcomes.  
Issues relating to the security forces are highly politicised. The Nepal Army is closely 
associated with conservative political forces and generally antagonistic towards the 
Maoists.15
 
 Even though the command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was handed 
over to the government-led Special Committee in January 2011, in reality, it leaves the 
Maoists with the responsibility of the PLA which still remains in cantonments. The 
government has taken over responsibility for supporting this force from the UN. The 
maintenance of this force together with a very large army is a major drain on state 
resources. Without the promised amalgamation of Maoist forces into the army and/or other 
security forces, the security situation remains precarious and there is a continued threat of 
violence. Although a resolution of the issue now seems close, the threat of mobilising PLA 
cadres may continue to haunt political processes leading to continued weak and divided 
government.    
Through processes of ‘informal governance’ PLA cadres are likely to retain links with the 
Maoist party. This may cause distortions in recruitment and promotion processes. This 
process can be observed in all aspects of government activity. With regard to the police, for 
example, there has been a history of alignment with the Nepali Congress and recruitment 
has been biased towards their party cadres. A recent PEA focused on Policing and Public 
Safety notes that the legal and institutional framework for policing, exacerbated by the 
uncertainties of the unstable coalition government, leaves police vulnerable to direct political 
interference at all levels.16 ICG concludes that, ‘The involvement of mainstream parties, 
police and administration officials in profiting from violence and offering protection is 
becoming institutionalised.’17
Although none of the major actors has an interest in returning to war, the incidence of 
violence is high and probably rising especially in the terai (plains adjacent to India) where the 
Madhesi Movement led to the expulsion of people originating from the hills (Pahades) and 
then splintered into smaller groups which descended from local political demands into 
criminal activity.
 Processes of ‘informal governance’ operating within the 
security services pose a threat both in terms of local violence and in terms of the eventual 
management of elections. With political threads running through all national institutions it is 
unlikely that elections can be entirely free and fair. 
18
                                                          
15 The United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN-M. For simplicity we refer to this party as ‘the 
Maoists’ 
 Gangs and hired thugs are available to support or oppose local interests. 
16 Jones, S (2010) p12 
17 ICG (2010) pi 
18 ICG (2010) p13 
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This has led to increased violence associated with political activity and also with any 
government activity that offers opportunities for patronage and corruption.19
  
 With no 
elections in the last decade for Village Development Committees (VDCs) and District 
Development Committees (DDCs) much of this violence has been directed towards elections 
and resources focused around schools. 
1.2 Political Factors 
The recent PEA studies give prime importance to the issue of centralised control. The roots 
of this phenomenon go back to the history of the monarchy and the assertion of central rule 
over disparate elements initially by conquest and later reinforced through total concentration 
of power at the political centre. The Maoists, having emerged as the strongest single political 
party, have shown a strong interest in centralizing power. As ICG observes, ‘They believe in 
authority and occasionally indulged their authoritarian streak once in government, stressing 
the need for order and discipline.... The Maoists want to control the state: they do not want it 
to wither away.’20
Centralizing tendencies are particularly strong within the political parties and there is little 
sympathy with notions of transparency and downward accountability prevalent among aid 
agencies and civil society. Political parties support the concept of strong central government 
although their ruthless rivalries ensure that the result is the opposite. Lack of democratic 
process and transparency within political parties allows patronage and rent-seeking 
behaviour to spread.
 Although the Maoists have engaged in multi-party democracy their long-
term strategy appears to be to create a single party state in which they would dominate.  
21
Because no party is able to create a government alone, recent years have been 
characterised by bargaining between the parties, especially for control of Ministries in which 
jobs can be found for party cadres or funds raised through sale of contracts. This hassled to 
a process in which the parties collude in dividing up the political spoils but because of 
uncertainty about whether they can hold their positions for long the looting of the state 
becomes more frenetic.
 Despite legislation intended to prevent it, political leaders maintain 
tight control over party finances and maintain their position through strong central control 
over the selection of candidates for election (when the time comes). Party cadres are highly 
dependent on a patron: ideological debate is not encouraged. 
22 This happens at different levels. In the education sector, parties 
have come together at District level and decided which party can take the benefits in which 
school. As ICG notes, School Management Committees (SMCs) have become ‘ways to 
retain loyal cadres and provide secondary opportunities for corruption and patronage.’23
Uncertainty about the future also encourages politicians to make short-term promises and 
pledges that they know they will be unable to fulfil but which challenge other political leaders. 
The result is an abstract world of promises and policies that bears little resemblance to 
  
                                                          
19 See ICG (2010) p19 
20 ICG (2010) p8 
21 Transparency International (2010) 
22 ICG (2010) p2, p5, p19 
23 ICG (2010) p20 
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reality. In the case of education, examples include ever-extending political promises of 
scholarships and free education. 
In such a situation it is easy for one party to blame another for any shortcomings when in 
fact they are colluding in the general arrangement. Thus there is a strong tendency to talk 
principle and act out individual interests. The Maoists have developed a further excuse for 
any shortcomings which is to make a distinction between long-term strategic objectives 
(often very radical) and short-term tactical actions which may be almost the opposite. This 
enables the Maoist leaders to exploit short-term gains while telling its supporters that they 
still plan to deliver on their fundamental purposes and promises. 
Processes of ‘informal governance’ have spread to the point that, according to the ICG, the 
state does not exist to deliver public services but for the informal distribution of state 
resources through political patronage networks: the raison d’etre of the state, ICG says, ‘is 
not serving citizens so much as servicing the needs of patronage networks and keeping 
budgets flowing and corruption going. The state is dysfunctional by demand. It is slow to 
reform because elite incentives are invested in the status quo and public pressure is rarely 
acute.’  
These negative political processes have penetrated deep into the civil service. Civil servants 
may be compelled to be politically aligned and are dependent on political patronage both for 
their formal advancement and in order to pursue corrupt practices with impunity. There is a 
danger that proposals from DPs may be viewed mainly from the perspective of job security, 
likelihood of transfers and opportunities for gain.24
The most important development since the peace agreement in 2006 has been the 
emergence of regionally-based political parties concerned with the issue of federalism. The 
unification of Madhesi
 Processes of consultation may be an 
unreliable guide to policy-making. Because civil servants are unlikely to make use of public 
services but generally rely on private services, they may not take a personal interest in 
issues relating to public services.  
25 parties into the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) appeared 
to create a serious challenge to centralization but Madhesi leaders have subsequently 
aligned themselves with national parties and, in some cases, traded their federalist 
objectives for a seat in government.26
Although civil society represents a counterweight to some of these negative political 
tendencies, NGOs suffer from many of the same weaknesses including politicisation and 
centralisation. A key exception is the success of Forest Users Groups. This shows that 
communities can mobilise around local management of resources but the situation is very 
different in relation to local involvement in education.  
 The threat of dividing the state is used mainly as a 
bargaining position. Although regional politics could create greater political fluidity, it seems 
likely that it will add to the problem of weak government.   
  
                                                          
24 Generally the objective is to remain in Kathmandu or at least in a major town. Transfers to remote areas 
denote punishment. 
25 Broadly this term refers to people of the plains who are outside the dominant ‘Pahadi’ group 
26 Maklian (2008), ICG (2010). 
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1.3 Economic Factors 
Since the end of the war in 2006, DPs have moved towards greater support through 
government institutions following the Paris Declaration Principle of Alignment but the 
dominance of ‘informal governance’ means that the effects can be distorted and reduced. 
Lack of monitoring of these unintended effects by DPs may have exacerbated the trends and 
allowed aid to become a major source of patronage and its associated processes of 
corruption.  
Not only is Nepal a country dependent on aid, but officials have also become dependent on 
the opportunities that arise through aid budgets. Work attached to aid budgets may offer 
different terms and conditions from government service and also opportunities for patronage 
through contracts.27
Aid also tends to reinforce centralization and in particular increases the disparity between 
Kathmandu and the rest of the country. Large amounts of aid are directed to capacity 
building exercises in the capital but the effects are rarely seen in the field. 
 These factors often lead to compliance with donor agendas and 
requests without rigorous analysis.    
Economic development is constrained by the workings of ‘informal governance’ and lack of 
open competition. A recent PEA study of the power sector, for example, found that ‘progress 
is dependent on the achievement of a greater degree of political stability and the 
establishment of a government that is able to pursue coherent policies and institutional 
reforms, and in particular to find a way of isolating priority areas of policy making from 
domination by short-term considerations of rent-seeking and political advantage’.28
Despite all these negative factors, the incidence of poverty has been falling in all groups over 
a number of years.
 
29
1.4 Social Factors 
 This is attributed largely to remittances from migrant workers. About 
half of rural households benefit from such remittances and in many cases the benefits 
extend beyond basic consumption towards luxury expenditure, notably for private education. 
Investment in productive activity is not much in evidence reflecting the poor business climate 
especially for small businesses without political patronage. Wealthy local leaders do not 
send their children to government schools and may invest in setting up private schools, 
creating further incentives to ignore or even undermine state services. 
DPs have been particularly concerned about social inclusion in Nepal in relation to dalits30, 
women and girls.31 A factor driving this concern is the evidence that these groups in 
particular have been drawn into conflict and violence as supporters of the Maoists. DPs have 
developed indices and monitoring systems for social inclusion and encouraged special 
programmes. An extensive recent study by Tufts University32
                                                          
27 See Shukya, S (2009) pp94-107 
 indicates that there has been a 
28 Ibid. The same view is put forward by Shakya, S (2009) 
29 The recent National Living Standard Survey (NLSS) detected a dramatic decrease in poverty from 41% to 13% 
over 8 years.  
30 Hindus outside the caste system – former ‘untouchables’ 
31 There are many forms of inclusion/exclusion. For a summary see Jones, S (2010) p3 and for a full analysis 
Bennett, L (2005) 
32 Sharma, R J and A Donini (2010) Towards a Great Transformation.. Tufts University 
A Political Economy Analysis of Education in Nepal 2011 
 
25 
 
significant improvement in relation to social inclusion especially in the school enrolment of 
dalits and girls. During the present study, respondents confirmed that in the hilly areas direct 
discrimination against dalits was now unusual although dalit participation in religious 
practices remained contentious. Dalits in Silgadi (Doti District) had faced violence from upper 
castes when they sought to enter the temple, but with support from the police they were able 
to do so in a large group. It was still considered risky for small groups of dalits to enter the 
temple. In some areas of the rural terai caste-based discrimination is still prevalent although 
less so following the reduction of Pahade influence because of the Madhesi Movement.  
Although there has been a marked increase in enrolment of girls in government schools, 
parents prefer to invest in boys when it comes to paying for private education. A further 
problem is that girls enrolled into government schools have higher drop-out rates than boys 
reflecting ongoing deficiencies such as lack of women teachers and continued demands 
from parents to attend to work in the house and fields. DP policies and NGOs have played a 
significant role in these social changes but mobilisation by the Maoists may have played a 
greater role. The spread of education, despite its many limitations, has also played a 
significant role. According to the Tufts University study- ‘Education was perhaps seen as the 
most important factor in bringing about transformation in Nepali society. People again and 
again emphasized the role of education in making them ‘aware’ and building up their 
confidence.’33
1.5. Implications for Education 
 
Geopolitical factors and persistent historical trends are likely to lock Nepal into a state of 
weak governance and this hassled to the prevalence of short-term rent-seeking behaviours 
characterised in this report as ‘informal governance’. The problem is that institutional 
interests now favour the dominance of ‘informal’ over ‘formal’ governance. In general aid 
inputs tend to exacerbate the problems rather than provide solutions. Individual aid officials 
need have no fear of doing themselves out of a job. As ICG concludes, ‘large sections of 
Nepal’s economy and political system rest on the solid foundation of state non-delivery and 
would be greatly disturbed by a dramatic improvement in efficiency.’34
This phenomenon has devastating consequences for public education. Because teachers 
are extremely important to the political parties as local cadres and potential organisers of 
elections they are willing to concede the right for teachers to dispense with controls from the 
formal institutions of government and ignore Head Teachers and SMCs. Similarly, Head 
Teachers, SMC Chairs and education officials may conspire at District level to abuse 
educational assets and funds. These activities are negotiated with and condoned by political 
parties. Weak structures of formal government in the justice sector allow this to continue with 
impunity.   
 
Cheating in exams is an opportunity for local bribery and corruption but its institutional form 
has come to serve the wider interest of educational institutions. The political parties may 
become involved in dividing up the passes between them according to an agreed formula.35
                                                          
33 Op cit p21 
 
Schools credited with higher pass rates attract added funding and education officials can use 
such success as reasons for further funding by DPs. Collusion in allowing girls to register in 
34 ICG (2010) p43 
35 ICG (2010) p5 
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several schools, false registers and even ‘ghost schools’ provide opportunities for income 
through scholarships and grants. The actions of individuals in these processes of ‘informal 
governance’ are not simply focused on personal gain but may reflect forces on them that 
they cannot resist, social norms and ideological commitments to specific political 
approaches. Much idealism is still invested in Maoist perspectives of a more equal society 
and conservative determination to prevent the Maoists from seizing unilateral power. Nepal 
should not be viewed as a corrupt society but simply as one in which there is an intense 
dichotomy between ‘formal governance’ and ‘informal governance’. On an individual basis 
this amounts to little more than a tendency to sort things out on a personal basis rather than 
through the abstractions of law and what many regard as external norms.      
In the current education system, students are conditioned to ‘informal governance’ and its 
implied focus on personal advance and disregard for society as a whole. The problem is that 
such a system tends to favour the rich and powerful, and can lead to increasing class 
divisions which, as has been shown in the past, can be mobilised by elite groups to bring 
about violent conflict.  
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Section Two: Sector-Level Analysis (Education) 
 
2.1 The Education Sector: Historical Legacy 
Nepal’s modern education system has a history of just over six decades. The end of the 
Rana oligarchy in 1951 and the beginning of an egalitarian political system created an 
opportunity to introduce universal access to education. A Board of Education was 
established in 1952 to initiate educational development in Nepal and the National Education 
Planning Commission (NEPC), with financial and advisory support from the United States, 
was tasked to study then existing educational initiatives and propose a homogenous national 
education system that would promote unity, democratic values and national pride. 
The first Five Year Plan for Education in Nepal (1956 – 1961) emphasised ‘national’ 
characteristics in the education system by adopting a national curriculum for primary level; 
compulsory teaching of the Nepali language in all schools, and categorically barring the 
teaching and learning of other indigenous languages in the schools. The NEPC report 
recommended that Nepal’s education be geared towards restoring historically ignored 
‘essential characteristics’ – ‘national pride, virility and individuality’.36
The royal coup of 1960 and the establishment of the Panchayat system added a new theme 
of rajbhakti (service to monarchy)
 
37 and placed an even greater emphasis on national unity 
and solidarity. The New Education System Plan (NESP) was announced in 1971 with an aim 
to meet the social, political and economic needs of the nation and again to solidify the 
project of nation building through the educational process. The main objective of the NESP 
was to make citizens loyal to the Crown and the Panchayat political system as well as 
develop scientific and technical human resources.38
The expansion of education during this period was said to be a ‘psychological adornment’ 
rather than a national strategy to produce citizens capable of contributing to the economic 
development of the nation.
 All schools were nationalised under the 
Ministry of Education and a national curriculum was made compulsory to enforce Panchayati 
values through teaching and learning across the country. The US and other donors viewed 
this plan as a ‘ploy’ by the palace to legitimise royal supremacy and solidify the Panchayat 
system. As a result, the education sector lost substantial international funding. 
39 Hence, the education system was developed as a tool for 
nationalising the diverse Nepali society, favourably disposed to the monarchy and the ruling 
elite (mainly representing hill high castes)40
The Nepalese school system has two types of schools: community schools (supported by 
government, but may be aided or unaided financially by government), and institutional 
schools (supported by parents and trustees and privately managed). Community schools 
 who were in control of the state apparatus. Even 
though two major political changes have occurred since, the legacy of the Panchayat 
education system still prevails. 
                                                          
36 See Pandey et al. (1956, p.74) 
37 See Onta (1996) for an analysis of making of the national history in Nepal 
38 See HMG (1971) National Education System Plan for 1971-76  
39 Ragsdale (1989, p.15) 
40 Lawoti (2007) 
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have three sub-categories: community-aided (fully supported financially and managed by the 
government), community-managed (supported and funded by the government fully but 
managed by the community) and community-unaided (getting either partial or no funding 
from the government). In addition, there are 766 religious schools (Madarasa, Gumba/Vihar 
and Ashram/Gurukul)41
The SSRP introduces changes to the overall structure of schooling and the extension of 
basic (compulsory) education by two years 
 that receive support including funding and curriculum materials from 
the government once they are recognised by the Department of Education.  
Table: Planned changes in Education Structure 
Age Grade 
Types of Schooling System 
Old System New System (SSRP) 
16 12 Higher Secondary Education 
(Grades 11-12) Secondary Education 
(Grades 9-12) 
15 11 
14 10 Secondary Education 
(Grades 9-10) 13 9 
12 8 
Lower Secondary Education 
(Grades 6-8) 
Basic Education  
(Grades 1-8) 
11 7 
10 6 
9 5 
  
Primary Education 
(Grades 1-5) 
  
8 4 
7 3 
6 2 
5 1 
4 Pre-Primary Education/ 
Early Childhood Development 3 
 
2.2 Schools during the armed conflict 
Some notable improvements in the education sector had taken place by the 1990s, for 
example, a dramatic increase in the number of schools, increased net enrolment rate and 
more equitable access to education across socioeconomic groups. However, in reality 
                                                          
41 DoE (2010b) 
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education and economic development were disconnected. Long-standing discontents and 
the increasing disappointment with elected governments provided a basis for the Maoists 
(then CPN-M) to declare the ‘People’s War’ in 1996. 
Involvement of teachers and students in political movements is not a new phenomenon in 
Nepal, but the emergence and expansion of the Maoist rebellion engaged both teachers and 
young people in the Maoist movement in different ways. School premises provided shelters 
for the rebels, young recruits (students) for their militia42 and a large group of educated 
people (teachers) who believed that the ‘People’s War’ was the only way of bringing about 
social and economic change in Nepal.43
Schoolteachers and young students were often caught in the middle of conflict between the 
security forces and the Maoist rebels. By 2004, an estimated 3,000 teachers had been 
displaced from schools in the rural areas, directly impacting on an estimated 100,000 
students’ education.
 
44
It was reported that more than 79 schools, one university and 13 district education offices 
were destroyed by the Maoists between January 2002 and December 2006, of which 32 
involved bomb explosions and at least 3 schools were caught in crossfire between the rebels 
and security forces.
 A significant number of displaced teachers still cite security reasons 
for their inability to return to their designated schools. A large number of school children as 
well as teachers were kidnapped to attend Maoist political training programmes or mass 
gatherings and a significant number were forced to join the war.  
45 Schools were targeted by security personnel who arrested, tortured 
and even killed teachers and school children suspected of being Maoist activists or 
sympathizers.46 A total of 145 teachers were killed by the warring parties during the 
conflict.47
 
   
2.3 Current Structural Issues 
2.3.1 Education reproduces caste-based disparities 
Despite the significant expansion of education during the last few decades, ethnic and caste-
based disparities persist in access and attainment. By 2001 the literacy rate among 
Brahmins (the so-called upper caste) was 70 percent compared with 10 percent among the 
several low-status caste groups that constituted 9 percent of the country’s population.48 
Socio-economic status is strongly correlated with access to private education: 44 percent of 
students from the richest quintiles are enrolled in private schools as compared to 7 percent 
from the three poorest quintiles.49
                                                          
42 Watchlist (2005) 
 Those who have access to English medium education in 
private schools are more likely to succeed in the modern job markets such as the business 
sector and non-governmental organisations. The wealthiest quintile benefits from the social 
43 Pherali (2011) 
44 Thapa and Sijapati 2004 
45 INSEC (2007) 
46 Amnesty International, 2005; Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre, 2006; Dhital, 2006 
47 INSEC (2007) 
48 Central Bureau of Statistics (2003) 
49 Central Bureau of Statistics, (2004) 
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and political networks of the privileged, and is likely to gain easier access to economic 
opportunities. This kind of social reproduction is difficult to break through project-based 
interventions and perpetuates the caste-based social order in Nepali society. 
Even within government schools there is evidence that poorer students are disadvantaged. 
Children form poorer families are much more likely to be absent from school because their 
labour is required for work in the fields or at home. Cultural factors may interact with these 
demands. Dalit children are considered much more likely to be absent than other children 
while there is strong pressure on children from Bahun-Chhetri families to continue their 
studies.50
2.3.2 Education is poorly aligned with the economy 
  
Even though education is valued, it is not necessarily perceived as a tool for guaranteeing a 
secure economic future for the majority of rural people. Employment opportunities are scarce 
and nepotism and favouritism are rampant. Almost one third of the Nepalese youth 
population is currently employed in unskilled jobs in the Gulf States, Malaysia and Korea and 
approximately 400,000 Nepalese go abroad in search of employment or better life prospects 
every year.51
The impact of remittances has so far been mainly felt in a desire for private education as a 
mark of social status but in some areas remittances have led to a boom in construction and 
this could provide the basis for greater demand for skilled workers. The education system 
remains very weak in relation to vocational skills. Some educationalists argue that vocational 
training options should be introduced from Grade 8 and that after passing the SLC exam 
students should have access to vocational training in 11 and 12 Grades. Currently these 
Grades are almost entirely focused on training in education for prospective teachers who are 
unlikely to find jobs. There is a need for an informed national debate about the function of 
education and in particular the place of vocational training in the system. DPs could usefully 
promote such a debate by conducting research and engaging with civil society.  
 This has resulted in weak and precarious economic growth, dependent on 
foreign employment, and not backed by proper economic structures within the country.  
2.3.3 Significant improvements in enrolment and equity 
There has been significant progress in access to and equity in education over the last 60 
years. The literacy rate among the adult population (15 years +) has increased to 57.9% and 
80.8% of the youth population are literate.52 From the situation in 1951 when there were 
8,505 students in 321 primary schools and 1,680 students in 11 secondary schools, currently 
there are 4,951,956 students studying in 32,648 primary and 1,130,336 students in 7,559 
secondary schools across the country. In the last 60 years the numbers of primary and 
secondary schools have increased approximately by 102 and 661 times respectively. The 
primary Net Enrolment Rate has increased significantly reaching 93.7 percent in 2009 
although the rate remains much lower in secondary schools.53
                                                          
50 Teachers Union of Nepal (2010) p26 
  
51 The Himalayan Times (2010) 
52 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2008) 
53 DoE (2010a) 
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Gender-based disparity in terms of access to education has almost ended with an average 
of 50 percent girls enrolment at all levels.54
Box: Key Educational Statistics 
 There is still a large gender disparity in the 
teaching workforce, of which less than 24 percent are female teachers. A significant 
improvement in dalit and janajati (indigenous peoples) participation in education has been 
achieved with an average of 15 percent dalits against their total population of 12 percent and 
40 percent janajatis against their total population of 40 percent. The following table presents 
a summary of key educational statistics but, as we will show in Section Three, there are 
huge variations between schools and areas: 
1. The average Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) in ECD/ PPCs is 70% with 69.2 for girls and 70.9 for 
boys. (SSR target: 72%) 
2. The proportion of students in grade 1 with ECD/PPC experience is 52.1%, with 52.4% girls and 
51.9% boys. (SSR target: 45%) 
3. Out of the total 33,160 schools 32,684 are primary, 11,939 are lower secondary, 32,685 basic, 
7,266 are secondary, 2,564 higher secondary and 7,559 secondary (grade 9-12) level.  
4. On average, the school student ratios are 1:152 at primary, 1:142 at lower secondary, 1:202 at 
basic (grade 1-8), 1:112 at secondary, 1:124 at higher secondary and 1:150 at secondary 
(grade 9-12) levels. 
5. The total number of students at primary, level is 4,951,956; at lower secondary the total is 
1,699,927; this makes a combined total of 6,651,883 in ‘basic’ education (Grades 1-8); 
institutional/private schools serve around 12% of children in basic education.   
6. Of the total enrolment at school, girls’ enrolment constitutes 50% at all levels;  
7. In comparison to their share in the total population at around 12%, the share of Dalit enrolment 
is 21.5% at primary level, 14.2% at lower secondary, 10.0% at secondary and 6.3% at higher 
secondary level.  
8. In comparison to their share in the total population at around 40%, the share of Janajati 
enrolment is 38.2% at primary level, 41.8% at lower secondary, 40.8% at secondary and 31.0% 
at higher secondary level. 
9. The promotion and repetition rates in grade 1 are 69.1% and 22.6%. The promotion rates in the 
upper grades are better as compared to the grade 1. The repetition rate in grade 8 is 6.6%. 
(SSR target: 7%) 
10. The overall survival rate to grade eight is 66.0%, with 65.2% for boys and 67.2% for girls. (SSR 
target: 49%) 
11. The proportion of female teachers by level in all types of schools is: 42.2% at primary level, 
25.9% at lower secondary level and 17.3% at secondary level.  
12. The proportion of Dalit teachers at primary, lower secondary and secondary levels are: 4.4%, 
2.6%, 2.7% respectively. 
13. The proportion of Janajati teachers at primary, lower secondary and secondary levels are: 
29.8%, 17.2% and 12.7 respectively.   
14. The percentage of fully-trained teachers in all types of schools is 80.7% at primary level, 63.6% 
at lower secondary level and 85.1 at secondary level respectively. 
15. The student-teacher ratios (based on the approved positions of the teachers) in community 
schools are 43:1 at primary, 57:1 at lower secondary and 35:1 at secondary level respectively.  
16. The number of students using a local language in the teaching and learning process as a 
transitional language at primary level is 17,273.  
Source: Educational Statistics of Nepal55
                                                          
54 DoE (2010b) 
 
55 DoE (2010b) 
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2.3.4 Quality of education remains low, whilst repetition and dropout rates are high  
Even though the primary Net Enrolment Rate has increased, 22.6 percent of these children 
fail to make satisfactory progress resulting in repetition in Grade 1 compared with an SSRP 
target of 8 percent repetition at primary level. More than one-third of children (34 percent) 
drop out by the time they reach Grade 8.  
A 24 percent pass rate in the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) examination in 1991 has now 
reached 68.67 percent in the year 2010. While this exceeds the SSRP target of 64 percent, 
the overall quality of education is debatable. SLC results can be questioned due to poorly 
managed exams and irregularities such as cheating, guidance by teachers in the exam halls 
and copying.56
2.3.5 Reliability of educational statistics 
 Even without such distortions it is questionable whether the exam results 
provide a good guide to the quality of education. An emphasis on rote-learning may 
discourage broader forms of development while also, as noted above, the education system 
is blamed for not serving the labour market.  
There is a serious issue with the reliability of educational statistics. It is difficult to obtain 
accurate data on teacher absenteeism because Head Teachers sign the registers for them 
even if they are absent and understate the problem when questioned.57
The Net Enrolment Rate reported by the DoE does not necessarily reflect the realities in the 
field. There are political and economic motivations for over reporting school-based statistics. 
Per capita funding, scholarships and other grants are associated with the number of children 
enrolled in the school, creating a clear economic advantage for reporting an increased 
student enrolment. In Dhanusha, it was found that out of a reported enrolment of 510, only 
205 children were present on a typical school day. One head teacher reported that the DEO 
provides much less funding than the number of children reported. This is because the DEO 
is aware of the practice of over reporting, so schools respond by over reporting even more. 
Additionally, DPs and other international agencies are keen to see educational improvement 
in statistical terms which the government experiences as a pressure to demonstrate 
improved enrolments and higher achievement. Such pressures create disincentives to 
scrutinise the reliability of data too closely at local, national and international levels which 
means that the process of educational development driven by international development 
goals may have produced unintended outcomes in relation to the reporting of data.  
 It is only be direct 
observation that more accurate assessments can be made. 
2.3.6 Ethnic and indigenous groups 
While Nepali is still the official language, the Constitution of Nepal 1990 restored the right to 
have primary education in the ‘mother tongue’. The government Curriculum Development 
Centre (CDC) has developed textbooks in various local languages including Maithili, 
Bhojpuri, Awadhi, Tamang, Limbu, Bantawa Rai, Chamling Rai, Sherpa, Gurung, Magar and 
Nepal Bhasha. However, there has been a lack of meaningful engagement with local 
communities in the design and development of mother tongue materials and more 
importantly, the limited capacity of the existing workforce to teach in local languages has not 
                                                          
56 This theme emerged during fieldwork in schools in Doti, Rolpa, Kapilvastu, Udaypur and Sankhuwasabha. 
57 Teachers’ Union of Nepal (2010) p30 
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been fully recognised. This suggests that the process is a top-down intervention without 
adequate preparation on the ground.58
The Maoist forty-point agenda includes a demand that- ‘all languages and dialects should be 
given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to 
higher levels should be guaranteed’.
  
59 This demand helped to expand the Maoist power 
base among the ethnic minorities, dalits and indigenous populations. The majority of Maoist 
activists and People’s Liberation Army cadres are young people from these groups.60
The twenty-one day long Madhesi movement in January 2007 gave added impetus to issues 
relating to ethnic identity, indigenous culture and local languages. There is a possibility that 
federal states may be defined largely in these terms with profound implications for education. 
In addition, such states may demand that education should be removed from central control. 
  
2.3.7 Private versus government schools 
Even though the majority of Nepalese children use public rather than private education, 
significant and increasing numbers are turning to private schools. Private schools in Nepal 
do not receive government funding, nor are their teachers trained or monitored by any state 
mechanism. These schools charge fees to parents and offer the curriculum in the English 
medium. Private schools generally perform significantly better than government funded 
schools in the SCL examination. Taking into account variations in different years the pass 
rate for those sitting SLC exams from private schools is double that of students from 
government schools.  
The general perception that all private schools in Nepal have a sound financial situation is 
debatable. A large number of private schools outside the Kathmandu valley struggle to 
survive, teachers prefer to work in the capital and more importantly, affordability of private 
education in smaller towns and rural areas is questionable. However, there is a widespread 
perception that private schools exploit their teachers by ignoring government regulations. 
Even though the government regulation requires independent schools to spend a minimum 
of 60 percent of their total income on teachers’ salaries. A recent evaluation conducted by 
the Department of Education shows that teachers in some private schools are paid up to 75 
percent less than the basic salary fixed by the government.61
The majority of teachers in private schools are not formally trained so this also raises 
questions about how the quality of teaching differs government schools. The SLC exam, 
which is the key indicator of government versus private school success, largely assesses 
students’ ability to memorise or reproduce answers during examinations. Students mainly 
focus on examination preparation rather than engaging in a meaningful learning process. 
This is re-emphasised by a growing business in selling examination papers, model questions 
and readymade answers that are easily available at bookstores so, even if students secure 
good results, this might not necessarily reflect the quality of learning.  
 
                                                          
58 Shields and Rappleye, (2008, p.269) 
59 Maoist Statements and Documents (2003) 
60 Lawoti (2005) 
61 Nayapatrika, 06 February 2011  
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The Maoists were among those to argue that the spread of private education is a 
consequence of the underperforming government education system.62
2.4 Institutional factors 
 During the armed 
conflict, the Maoists were critical of commercialisation of education and demanded the 
abolition of the private education system but their position appears to have moderated today. 
Despite the expansion and growing sophistication of teacher training there is considerable 
concern about transferability of these skills into classroom practice.63
The Curriculum Development Centre has revised curricula at basic education level by 
incorporating local content as well as topics on Peace-building, Human Rights and Civic 
education.
  Due to the lack of a 
proper classroom monitoring system, it is difficult to establish how teaching practices have 
improved, but it is generally accepted that no substantial change has occurred in the 
pedagogical culture of most schools. This suggests that policy level interventions alone do 
not achieve positive outcomes and points back towards factors such as the undermining of 
school management by politicized unions as fundamental obstacles to change.  
64 However, teachers have not been trained properly to deal with these sensitive 
issues. There is also a growing concern about effective implementation of education policies. 
A report published by the National Centre for Educational Development reveals that around 
60 percent of teacher development policies were unimplemented or partially implemented. 
However, ‘resource-tied policies, provisions under training curriculum and legally obligatory 
policies were found implemented in the majority cases’.65
The nature of the education system under a new Constitution are yet to be identified but 
federalism is likely to be a key factor especially if the responsibility for education is given to 
federal states. Although issues of ethnic identity and education in the ‘mother tongue’ are 
being advanced by politicians, the financial implications of such changes have yet to be 
analyzed and it is clear that the debates are likely to continue for a long time to come.  
 In other words the system 
complies with the most basic formal requirements but is not responsive to issues that would 
support education quality in the wider sense. 
2.5 The School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP)  
The School Sector Reform Plan 2009-15 (SSRP) was introduced in 2009 as a key policy of 
the Ministry of Education and designed with the active involvement of Nepal’s development 
partners. It was developed as a continuation of on-going programmes notably Education for 
All (EFA). The SSRP seeks to restructure the education system, improve quality and 
institutionalise performance accountability’.66 The plan integrates ‘key policy goals and 
values, including the right to education, gender parity inclusion and equity’.67
                                                          
62 DoE (2010b) 
  
63 DoE (2010b) 
64 NCED has produced a teacher-training manual and has reported trained 144 master trainers who are 
expected to train more trainers in the future. These trainers will then train over 200,000 teachers in basic 
education level. 
65 NCED (2063 B.S.) 
66 SSRP, p.1 
67 Ibid 
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The cost of the SSRP over the first five years is estimated to be $2.626 billion. The 
Government of Nepal has committed $2.002 billion and development partners have pledged 
$0.5 billion. ‘The Government expects that the funding gap can be closed by employing a 
resource mobilisation strategy, targeting non-pooling development partners, I/NGOs and the 
Catalytic Fund from the Fast Track Initiative (FTI)’. 
A large portion of the annual education budget (67 percent in 2009-2010) was allocated for 
basic education (1 – 8) whereas 18 percent was allocated for secondary education.68
The SSRP has set baseline indicators for monitoring purposes. The following table provides 
a summary of the indicators: 
 The 
Status Report 2010-011 shows good progress towards achieving its targets by 2015-16. The 
Early Childhood Education and Development (ECED) sector has spread rapidly. However, 
the Report cites issues around availability of learning materials, sufficient budget and 
effective strategies to retain (the low-paid) ECED facilitators.  
                                                          
68 DoE (2010a) 
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 Source: SSRP, p.2 
Development partners and government officials strongly support the idea of decentralisation 
in education. Although the plan was not developed by the political parties, and has not been 
enacted in law, it is difficult for politicians to reject ideas such as free basic education, 
instruction in mother tongue, technical and vocational education to better equip young 
people with employment skills, empowering local communities to take ownership of the 
school, integrating local content in the curriculum to enhance relevance of their education 
and focus on quality education. The officials argue that the SSRP is a technical plan and 
therefore would fit in any kind of political structure that Nepal might adopt in the future- 
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‘The SSRP is not a revolution but continuity of previous educational programmes. It 
has three key themes: inclusion, restructuring and decentralisation. The provision of 
scholarship and other grants are aimed at enhancing educational opportunities for 
marginalised groups. The educational restructuring is intended to improve the quality of 
education and student retention as well as to secure funding for basic education 
(grades 1-8). Decentralisation has no alternative other than developing capacities of 
people to take extended roles in this process. However, it faces a number of risks 
including resistance from politicians who intend to control the system from the centre 
rather than devolving power to the local levels.’   
Senior Official, Ministry of Education 
In practice the progress of the SSRP has been hindered by lack of underpinning legislation 
which has made many officials reluctant to push forward. In addition, contentious transitional 
politics and politicised teaching workforce have added further obstacles. As there is no 
elected government at local level, the initiative lacks a responsible local body for its 
implementation. Furthermore, the SSRP has not been effectively communicated to 
educational stakeholders at local level. Most head teachers and teachers in the rural areas 
are ignorant about the aims of the plan and see it as another government initiative that will 
be talked about until the DPs’ funding runs out. They continue with what they have been 
doing and report to DEO as required.  
The SSRP also aims to ensure that all school teachers possess the necessary knowledge 
and skills to facilitate teaching and learning effectively. Teacher training and professional 
development are not well integrated. The overemphasis on a ‘delivery model’ of teacher 
training is likely to ignore other critical aspects such as the sociopolitical context, critical 
appraisal of the content, motivation and trainee’s willingness to transfer skills into practice, 
which are also important in enhancing the impact of training.69
There has been a significant improvement in enhancing functional literacy among youth and 
adults. The situation of 30 percent adult literacy in 1990 increased to 46 percent in 2001 and 
Nepal is aiming to achieve 75 percent adult literacy by 2015. However, availability of learning 
materials and allocation of sufficient funding to support the adult literacy programme has 
generally become a hindrance in achieving this target.  
 The real challenge to 
successful implementation of SSRP may lie in motivating the teaching workforce to 
transform their pedagogical practices, instructional supervision and monitoring of 
programmes at local level.  
2.6 Stakeholder Analysis 
Teachers’ unions oppose the transfer of school management to the community. They fear 
that their ‘rights and status’ will not be secure70 and their position is reflected in the policies 
of the political parties. The Maoists formally oppose both transfer of schools to the 
community and the provision of private education.71
                                                          
69 NCED (2063 B.S.) 
 SMCs have strong political 
characteristics and in many schools the SMC Chair and the head teacher may have 
conflicting political views, preventing any common understanding of school management 
issues. Local level party organizations have close links with school management 
70 Vaux and Smith (2006, p.25) 
71 Caddell (2007, p.15) 
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committees. There are also political pressures on DEOs relating to issues such as recruiting 
the relief quota teachers, distributing scholarships, school auditing and school upgrading. In 
many schools in the terai politics and crime often intersect and schools have not been able 
to form SMCs due to threats from armed groups.  
The leadership and management capacity of head teachers was weakened significantly 
during the armed conflict. Maoist pressure for mandatory donations, compulsory attendance 
at their political programmes, intimidation and potential physical assaults left head teachers 
and teachers demoralised. During the emergency period, mutual trust amongst teachers 
eroded considerably. 
Teachers rely heavily on textbooks. Lecture methods and rote-learning dominates. 
Opportunities for continuing professional development or the provision of ongoing support 
are virtually non-existent. Professional rewards for teachers are negligible. The chances of 
promotion in the teaching profession are poor but permanent positions are secure because 
of unionisation. This leaves teachers in a stagnant career. Teachers in villages often become 
involved in other activity such as local business and farming. 
Many parents cannot afford to send their children to secondary education or higher 
education due to their poor economic conditions. While the scholarship programme is 
positive, the amount (RS.350 – 1000 per year) is not attractive when they need their children 
to support them at home. The consequences of this include continued marginalisation of 
many of the country’s poor and disadvantaged groups.  
Most school children are involved in community-based organizations such as children’s 
clubs, youth clubs and cultural groups. These are supported by NGOs working in the 
community and they organize a wide range of capacity building activities. However, there is 
a lack of school-community partnership in these initiatives. Teaching and learning in the 
school could benefit substantially from partnerships with these organizations and vice versa. 
Some young students are organized under student unions affiliated to political parties.  
2.7 Implications of the education sector analysis  
• There is no strategic vision for educational development based on a common 
understanding of Nepal’s future and specific needs from the education sector. Current 
approaches deal with issues in a piecemeal fashion leaving issues such as the purpose 
of education unresolved. The political parties, even if they were capable of such vision, 
are mostly focusing on ongoing political uncertainties and building patronage networks 
that undermine rather than support education. The SSRP is essentially a technical plan 
designed collaboratively by bureaucrats and DPs.  Officials are uncertain whether to 
implement key changes proposed by the SSRP in the absence of an appropriate 
Education Act.  
 
• Political discourses, particularly on the issue of federalism and ethnic rights are likely to 
impact on the SSRP but the uncertain political future has made it difficult to plan for a 
multicultural and ethnically diverse state. Progress has been made in the curriculum and 
textbooks but not in relation to education structures. 
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• The education sector has made significant progress over the past two decades 
especially in terms of spread and quantity. But there is considerable doubt about the 
quality of education and its function in social change. 
 
• There is an increasing divide between private and state education, yet there seems to be 
little reference to the implications of this in the SSRP and little account taken of how the 
education reforms will play out across these different school environments. 
 
• School culture is heavily influenced by politics, and political interests often override the 
teaching and learning processes. The strong relationship of teacher unions and political 
parties has undermined effective management of teachers. 
 
• The transferability of pedagogical knowledge and skills into practice is a critical issue in 
teacher development. 
 
• More sustainable interventions are necessary to bring about change in education. 
Increased participation of teachers, local communities and other stakeholders is vital in 
identifying problems and in designing and implementing effective programmes. 
Programmes originated in the centre are less likely to succeed.  
 
• While several NGOs conduct educational programmes around and within schools, there 
is a lack of working partnership between government agencies and NGOs working in the 
education sector. 
 
The political economy relationships between structures, institutions and actors are complex. 
Poverty and lack of economic opportunities act as dominant drivers whilst the motivations of 
individual actors are also heavily influenced by transitional politics. Excessive politicisation of 
educational institutions has seriously damaged professional integrity thereby increasing 
educational actors’ dependency on political patronage. The following is an attempt to 
represent the relationships between various stakeholders within the education system-      
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Section Three: Problem-Level Analysis  
 
Introduction 
The preceding sections have focused on structural factors at the macro and education sector 
levels. Section Three analyses problems relating to education policies and focuses on the 
perceptions and influence of individual actors, notably DEOs, Head-teachers, SMC Chairs, 
parents and children. It draws on the field visits, focus groups and interviews. 
 
3.1 General Structural Constraints 
The field studies provide extensive evidence of the structural problems identified in Section 
One. As an example of the collusion of political parties in ‘dividing up the spoils’, in Doti they 
have created an ‘association’ of teacher unions to negotiate education issues collectively. 
The representative of the association sits in the District Education Office. This is not an 
attempt to keep politics out of education or reduce political influences but instead allows the 
parties to decide on their own solutions and present them to the DEO for implementation. 
The arrangement allows the parties to manage the appointment of teachers and allocation of 
funding in their own interests. By using their links with the central political party (and the 
collusion among parties associated with weak government) local politicians disempower 
DEOs and other officials. By protecting teachers they also disempower Head Teachers and 
SMCs. Agreement among the parties appears to work quite smoothly in Doti -from the 
parties’ perspective but to the detriment of education. But the struggle for resources is much 
more intensive in the terai where cooperation gives way to open violence and intimidation in 
many cases. This reflects a general characteristic that while the structural forces identified in 
Section One operate in all areas, they operate at different strength in different areas. 
‘Informal governance’ is weakest in the mountain and hill areas and strongest in the terai 
where it is backed by violence and threats of violence.  
Local preferences can also make a difference. People and parties in the District have shown 
an exceptionally strong interest in educational expansion, extending primary schools to 
‘basic’ schools and especially formation of Higher Secondary schools (Grades 11 and 12). 
Substantial funding has been made available for education through the District Development 
Committees (DDCs) and Village Development Committees (VDCs). In fact the Committees 
have gone beyond the full amount permitted for education and transferred funds from other 
budgets (notably road-building) into education. This funding is used not only for capital 
expenditure but also for recurrent costs including local recruitment of additional teachers. 
Although difficult to prove there were reports that the allocation of these funds was done on 
a basis of ‘proportional representation’ between the parties (i.e. a balance of SMC 
Chairpersons, contractors etc favoured by different parties).  
In Rolpa the local drivers were different. Very limited funding was directed towards education 
and the focus was on road-building. This difference must arise from the very different 
historical background of the two Districts. Rolpa has been highly neglected in respect of 
basic infrastructure while Doti has a long tradition of education dating back to early efforts 
under the monarchy. Ethnic and cultural factors may also be a cause of this variation. The 
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predominantly Magar population of Rolpa has shown less inclination to education than the 
heterodox and upper caste population of Doti. A comparison of the two Districts suggests 
that multiple factors affect educational preferences and that, despite the filter created by 
political parties and absence of democratic structures, local preferences can affect 
outcomes. 
Strong variation between adjacent schools in the same District also suggests that human 
agency plays an important role in educational outcomes. In all areas, including the terai, it 
was possible to find schools that were functioning well in spite of the obstacles. Next to 
these might be schools that were otherwise identical but failing badly. Despite the structural 
constraints described in Section One, SMC Chairs and Head-teachers do seem to make a 
difference. The disturbing feature is that success takes place against the odds.  
3.2 Education Policy in Practice 
An earlier review of EFA in Nepal72
Over the last five years, the overall rate of enrolment has increased and there is generally 
huge overcrowding in Grade 1 classes. As this group proceeds through the school the 
demand for teachers will increase. The role of the unions in preventing rational deployment 
of teachers has made the government reluctant to recruit more permanent teachers and 
instead staff have been recruited on a ‘temporary’ basis. These teachers, recruited by the 
central government, receive the same salary as permanent staff but do not receive some 
other benefits such as pensions. The third category is staff recruited directly by the school. 
 noted an imbalance in teacher deployment between 
hilly areas, where there were often too many teachers, and the terai, where there were too 
few. Because of the political power of teacher unions, teachers could not be redeployed to 
the areas where they were needed. This is still the case today. Over the course of time, the 
pattern of teacher deployment has remained rigid while the spread of students has changed, 
and continues to change rapidly.  
The unions have recruited ‘temporary’ teachers into their ranks but it is the locally-recruited 
teaching posts that attract the most political attention because they offer the opportunity to 
place party cadres in paid jobs. With the huge expansion in student numbers, the number of 
such teaching posts is substantial. Typically the pattern of staffing observed in schools was 
40% teachers from the permanent government cadre, 30% ‘temporary’ teachers and as 
many as 30% of teachers locally employed. 
Teacher absenteeism is a serious problem but reliable data is difficult to come by. Studies 
indicate that absenteeism is largely seasonal (especially early departure and late reporting 
for duty after holiday periods) and that the practice is compounded by political factors which 
lead to under-reporting.73
The problem of insufficient teachers is not only one of numbers and attendance. Teachers of 
Science, Maths and English are generally lacking in government schools. These are the 
subjects in which students most commonly fail in the SLC exam. The exam success of 
 Field visits to schools confirmed that this practice was widespread 
and that even when teachers attended school they often arrived late and left early.  
                                                          
72 Vaux, Smith and Subba (2006) 
73 Foundation for Human Development (2004), Teachers Union of Nepal (2010) 
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private schools arises largely from emphasis on these subjects and particularly because they 
do much better in English, the language of instruction in private schools.  
Except when local VDCs cover the costs, state schools are obliged to raise funds from 
parents to cover the deficit of teachers. In spite of government promises of free education, 
parents do not complain about this and officials turn a blind eye, acknowledging that there is 
no other way of addressing the problem. Schools typically recover the cost of additional 
teachers as annual fees to students in the Grades where extra teachers are employed. In 
effect, education remains largely free in Primary Schools (1-5) but charges are introduced in 
Secondary Grades, and even the government schools are practically self-financing in 
Grades 11-12. This is not inconsistent with the government focus on free basic (now 
meaning Grades 1-8) education.   
The review of EFA in 2006 noted that while enrolment rates were steadily rising (and this 
trend has continued) the rates for retention and repetition were problematic. A significant 
reason for students to drop out of school is uncertainty whether it is worth staying for the full 
10 years needed to reach the SLC exam at Grade 10 especially because the pass rate for 
students from government schools was very low (under 30% at that time). The issues 
received attention both from DPs and the media. Since then the pass rate has risen 
dramatically to over 60% in 2010 followed by a sudden fall to 46% in 2011. Since it is 
unlikely that either the exams or the students changed so dramatically over the period, the 
explanation must be sought elsewhere. 
The key factor seems to be that the pass rate correlates with incentives. In 2006 financial 
incentives were introduced for schools with a pass rate above 50%.74 This led to creation of 
new budgets controlled by DEOs, proportional to pass rates. Cheating has long been a 
problem in exams75
Officials have facilitated the process by turning a blind eye to cheating and by relaxing 
controls. Up to 2006, a failure in any of the eight subjects in the SLC exam led to failure 
overall and the necessity of retaking the entire exam a year later. Since then the rules for the 
exam have been relaxed. Failure in up to two subjects can be remedied by retaking the 
exam a few weeks later. In this process practically all students (who failed the exam a 
couple of weeks earlier) achieve a pass. The explanation put forward quite openly in 
interviews is that cheating takes place ‘en masse’ in the SLC retakes. 
 but it appears to have become more widespread and has taken a 
systemic form within the last five years. Cheating takes two forms. Firstly there are cases of 
help to individual students by friends who may even sit the examination on their behalf. The 
second type is systemic cheating organised by teachers who may give out model answers in 
advance of the exam or write up key points on a board.  
Because exams are normally held in government schools and are invigilated by teachers 
from government schools, it might be expected that the system would benefit students from 
those schools rather than private schools but, because practically all government teachers 
put their children into private schools, cheating often takes the form of government teachers 
cheating on behalf of private pupils. This may significantly contribute to the very high pass 
                                                          
74 According to local reports, DEOs receive an incentive of Rs 1,00,000 if the SLC pass rate exceeds 50%.  
75 Mathema and Bista (2006) 
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rates of private schools (90% in 2011 compared with 46% for students from government 
schools). It also highlights the problem that the interests of teachers in government schools 
do not coincide with those of their students. 
The SSRP has so far had little impact in schools. DEOs regarded it as a proposed policy 
and, because it was not enacted in law, could not form the basis of their work. They 
anticipated that future changes of government in Kathmandu could lead to changes. They 
were involved in the expansion of schools but constrained by lack of any new teachers to 
deploy. In effect, schools were moving ahead with their own resources and support from 
VDCs and DDCs. The roots of the problem of implementing the SSRP go back to the 
fundamental issue of teacher deployment. In some schools in hilly areas there are reported 
to be more teachers than students but they cannot be moved because of union protection. 
Without a rational deployment of teachers, DPs and the Ministry itself are reluctant to snction 
new teaching posts. Demand for school expansion, as already noted, is not only coming 
from the SSRP but from local communities. A Primary School in Silichool (Rolpa District) has 
operated as a Secondary School for nearly a decade without being adopted by government. 
It receives informal help from government in terms of ‘temporary’ teachers and some funds 
for buildings but is left with a substantial deficit on running costs. The SMC Chairman said 
that he was reluctant to charge fees because he wanted the school to be adopted by 
government rather than go private. This left the school in an extremely tight financial 
position. Nevertheless the SLC pass rate was very high and, because a large number of 
teachers were locally recruited, there seemed to be none of the usual problems of teacher 
discipline. The SMC was able to take real control over (and responsibility for) the school. 
This indicates that local management can be made to work: but the institutional issue of 
union politicisation must be tackled for this to happen on a wide scale. 
3.3 Private Education  
Over the last decade, private schools have extended their presence from the Kathmandu 
Valley and major towns (where they were limited during the conflict) into small towns and 
along the main roads. Occasionally private schools are also found in remote villages. The 
main attractions of private schools are better exam results, use of English as the medium of 
instruction (leading to better job prospects), status and social connections. 
Teachers in the public sector are generally better qualified and better paid than those in the 
private sector, the infrastructure of government schools is generally better and the 
curriculum is more sophisticated.76
Private schools have extended their attraction because government schools fail to perform 
for reasons outlined above –primarily the lack of control over teachers. Private school 
proprietors generally seek to prevent the activity of unions and where SMCs exist in private 
schools they seem to be dominated by the proprietors. Teachers are subject to a ‘hire and 
fire’ system which enables the school management to control them very tightly and make 
them work harder than is generally the case with teachers in the public sector. Costs are 
 There is a very wide range of private schools and large 
variations in cost. The cheaper private schools focus very strongly on rote-learning for exam 
passes. 
                                                          
76 In Kathmandu there are a few elite schools with much better facilities than government schools. We are 
talking here about the general mass of schools outside Kathmandu. 
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driven down by paying teachers much less than government teachers (commonly about two 
thirds and without any other benefits) and demanding more regular attendance, willingness 
to cope with large amounts of homework and more intensive teaching schedules.  
Although there are private schools with excellent facilities, especially in Kathmandu, 
elsewhere private schools are dominated by issues of cost and profit. The infrastructure of 
private schools observed during this study is generally worse than that of government 
schools. While most government schools have added several earthquake-resistant modern 
buildings since the end of conflict in 2006, some private schools operate in appalling 
temporary buildings and others are poorly maintained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parents investing in education make different choices for different children, with particularly 
strong variation between girls and boys. This has led to a preponderance of boys in private 
school and an increasing ratio of girls in government schools. Parents with similar incomes 
may make different choices depending on the position of education within other priorities 
such as funding a migrant or building a house. Changing economic circumstances may 
result in children switching from public to private education and back again. But it is more 
difficult to switch children into private school after the initial Grades because of English as 
the language of instruction. A parent in Silgadhi lamented that he could not put his daughters 
into private school (although he could now afford it) because they were too old to start in 
English medium. Parents said they were more confident about challenging teachers in 
private schools (where they were paying) compared with government schools where they 
perceived themselves as recipients of a free service.  
The private/public debate raises the question of what is education quality. One of the 
teachers from the government school in Kirtipur argued that producing high pass rates in the 
SLC exams did not necessarily reflect what the young people of Nepal should be learning. 
He pointed out that the private school graduates have very little knowledge and 
understanding about Nepali society, culture and politics as compared to those who graduate 
from government schools. A deputy-head teacher from a private school argued that private 
schools were contributing to the national economy by educating children from economically 
privileged families who would otherwise have sent their children to schools in India. They 
provide value for the money invested in the education sector and provide employment to a 
large number of an educated workforce. He argued that there is a better professional 
practice in private schools because teacher absenteeism is not an issue.  
In Kapilvastu, in the terai, there is a clear social divide between public and private schools. In 
the government school 95 percent of children are Tharu (an indigenous group) and it is often 
referred to as the ‘Tharu school’ whereas the private school next door was attended 
The issue of social status 
A private school housed in tin shacks in a remote part of Rolpa District was drawing students 
away from a nearby government school with new buildings and well qualified and committed 
government teachers. The teachers attributed this trend to parents’ desire for status. They noted 
that several children had come back to the government school because their parents ran out of 
money. In another case a private school had opened near another very good government school 
but later closed down again. Head-teachers in these schools were considering the possibility of 
opening up English-medium streams in their Primary Schools.   
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predominantly (96 percent) by children from Pahade (Hindu castes from hilly areas) 
background and known colloquially as the ‘Pahade school’.  
Although most private schools are secular, profit-making institutions there are other 
categories including religious schools. In Nepalganj (Banke District) the DEO drew attention 
to the specific problem of Madrassa (Muslim) schools. Although in the past these schools 
have remained separate from the government system they now seek integration. According 
to the DEO this may have arisen because, with large families, Muslims are finding it too 
expensive to maintain the Madrassas and hope to secure access to government funding. 
Government policy allows for one subject to be chosen by the local school and this policy 
allows religious education to continue in such schools provided that they also follow the full 
national curriculum.  
3.4 School Management  
The position of SMC Chair provides a significant opportunity to control resources and extend 
patronage networks. While the SMC Chair may have strong political links, this is not so 
evident in the case of Head-teachers. This arrangement makes it possible for the two key 
figures to work together. In theory the SMC Chair focuses on funding issues and external 
relations while the Head-teacher focuses on teaching issues and the internal management of 
the school. In practice one or other is dominant. SMC Chairs usually take the lead in the 
(highly politicised) terai while Head-teachers appear more likely to take the lead in the hilly 
areas. 
Why are SMCs politicised? 
 
• There is a political vacuum at local level due to the absence of local government. 
As government institutions schools provide a platform for exercising local level 
political power. Political parties endeavour to maintain their local profile through 
representation on the SMCs.  
 
• Holding SMC positions, particularly the ‘Chair’ provides social and political status 
which contributes to a political career in the party. 
 
• Schools have become places for expanding political ideologies. SMCs can 
influence teachers, students and parents to pursue their political agendas. 
 
• Schools receive direct funds from government and the SMCs have influence on 
how to manage those funds. Supporting investment in school development (e.g. 
building classrooms) helps political representatives gain social credibility.  
 
• SMCs are not clear about their roles and do not receive any training. 
 
 
Close collaboration between the SMC Chair and Head-teacher can mitigate political 
problems and establish a level of discipline in the school. Problems usually revolve around 
financial issues such as: 
• The current expansion of schools into higher Grades presents opportunities for 
contracting work; 
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• The Per Capita Fee (PCF) paid to the school by the Ministry; 
• Relations with DEOs and VDC/DDC Secretaries; 
• Teacher recruitment; 
• Opportunities to dispose of or manage school lands and property;  
• Charges to parents for local employment of teachers. 
Especially in the terai, securing the position of SMC Chair has become the subject of intense 
political competition especially where there are school lands and properties. In the absence 
of elections for DDCs and VDCs, the election of SMC Chairs presents practically the only 
opportunity for political parties to measure their strength. The ferocity of these elections may 
arise from this factor rather than from any concern for education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEOs are unable to stand up to the teacher unions and this undermines the work of the 
Supervisors who are supposed to monitor the schools and of Resource Persons supposed 
to provide training support to teachers. In the terai most of the officials have given up the 
attempt to do their job and remain in the District office. The situation in hilly areas is more 
positive.  
In theory the SMC should reflect a wide range of stakeholder interests, including 
representatives of women and dalits. In practice the SMC is run by the SMC Chair. We 
found no example of an SMC working in line with the regulations. Parents expressed 
reluctance to question teachers. In general students were also found to be docile even in the 
face of flagrant abuse by teachers such as long absences and late arrival in class. In only a 
Public Education in the Terai 
A government school in Kailali District had experienced a loss of more than half of its 
students over three years. The number of teachers had remained the same because 
teacher unions and political parties had connived to protect them from transfer. In spite of 
this excess of teachers, nearly half the classes in the schools were observed to be 
lacking a teacher. If a teacher was absent no work had been set for the children and no 
other teacher made an effort to provide cover. Teachers were observed chatting in the 
sun while students sat in the classroom with nothing to do.  
In one class a boy described as a trainee teacher was standing in front of the class 
uncertain what to do and lacking any support or supervision from the other teachers. 
There were few students in the higher classes but two primary classes (amounting to 
over 120 students) had been merged into one with a single teacher. The Head-teacher 
said he was unable to manage the teachers because of political involvements and the 
power of the unions. 
In this school, a recent dispute about the SMC Chair election had escalated into stone-
throwing. A group of parents interviewed separately said that they were well aware of 
these failings and disturbances but could do nothing about it. The DEO said that the most 
he could achieve was to prevent any escalation of violence by mediating with the SMC 
Chairman and political parties but he lacked any powers of enforcement.  
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few cases were students willing to go and call teachers who were loitering in the staff-room. 
In Rolpa we witnessed the lock-out of a head-teacher followed by a complaint from students 
in the open assembly about an absent teacher. The Head-teacher’s assurances that the 
teacher would rapidly return appeared to be accepted. In some schools NGOs have 
encouraged student groups to try to improve the quality of education by developing Codes of 
Conduct and other means. In some areas, NGOs working with parents and students have 
declared schools as Zones of Peace and insisted that political activity and gang violence is 
kept out of the school. This appears to work quite well when there is a recognisable external 
body to negotiate with and was particularly effective in relation to school closures caused by 
the Madhesi Movement, but is less effective in relation to internal management problems 
and against local violence.    
3.5 Teachers and Teaching 
The practice of rote-learning is not derived from national teacher training courses or from the 
curriculum. Both discourage such an approach. It appears to be largely a response to the 
exam system. This includes not only the SLC exam at Grade 10 but the annual exams that 
dictate whether a student moves to the next Grade. Teachers interpret their task as making 
sure that students pass these exams. There is little emphasis on development of thought 
processes or reflection on society. This creates a major discrepancy between the theory of 
education in Nepal and its practice. While further effort to reform the exam system might 
help, the fundamental obstacle may lie in social attitudes that condone a ‘rote-learning’ and 
‘exam-led’ approach. Even though teachers and parents may be exposed to other ideas they 
tend to revert to these limited stereotypes. Rather than transform society, the education 
system seems to be drawn back to the past.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The crucial actor in bringing about positive change is the Head-teacher. A charismatic Head-
teacher can make a significant difference. This immense responsibility perhaps deserves 
better recognition from the education system. One Head-teacher told us that he is paid the 
same as a Higher Secondary teacher except for an extra allowance of just Rs500 (less that 
$9) per month. This does not adequately reflect the increasing responsibilities of Head-
teachers coping with current complexities of politicisation, competition with private schools, 
charging and expansion. 
Quality Education  
Parents in Kapilvastu felt that there was no pressure to enforce quality teaching 
at primary level. It was not unusual to find children in Grade 5 (9 - 10 years) still 
struggling to read and write Nepali. Such young children could not raise voice 
against teacher absenteeism or put pressure on the management to ensure that 
their course is delivered properly. They thought that officials were only concerned 
with SLC exams and paid little or no attention to children’s achievement at 
primary level. Teachers said that the poor level of students coming into 
secondary schools made it necessary to resort to cheating in order to pass the 
SLC exam. 
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Schools will also need to face the full implications of federalism and the increasing demand 
for education in the ‘mother tongue’. There is considerable debate and difference of opinion 
on this issue. There is widespread agreement that the old textbooks created tensions by 
promoting the notion of Nepal as a ‘Hindu Kingdom’ largely ignoring the history and culture 
of non-Hindu and indigenous groups, or reducing them to subservient stereotypes. Revision 
of the curriculum and textbooks over the last five years has largely succeeded in eliminating 
the extremes, although the full range of diversity in Nepal is not yet fully recognised. 
There is much less agreement about the issue of education in the ‘mother tongue’. Because 
this is now asserted as a right under the Constitution the Ministry of Education has moved 
forward to develop textbooks in around a dozen languages and multi-lingual education has 
been piloted in selected schools. It is generally assumed that Nepali would be taught in all 
cases although not always as the language of instruction. The key question is whether 
education in the ‘mother tongue’ can or should replace Nepali right through the system. An 
advantage is that students are likely to do better in their ‘mother tongue’ than in Nepali, 
which for many is essentially a foreign language. Arguably, the main linguistic groups could 
be recognised for jobs in government and local business. The disadvantage is that such 
students might not reach a good enough level in Nepali to communicate across the whole 
country. Some observers consider that the move will boost ethnic diversity while others see 
it as a route to the break-up of the country. 
The General Secretary of an NGO based in Kathmandu representing the Limbu people (a 
large linguistic group in the East) considered that education in the ‘mother tongue’ was really 
a political ploy intended to gain support from ethnic groups. He said that if a political party 
promised education in the ‘mother tongue’ the others would have to follow for fear of losing 
support from that group but there has been no serious debate about the issues. He 
expressed concern that DPs (and the Ministry) were pressing ahead in advance of a proper 
and dispassionate consultation. Teachers and Head Teachers generally argued that it was 
useful for teachers in pre-primary and primary Grade 1 to understand the local language in 
order to help children who had difficulty with Nepali but the objective was to help them make 
the transfer rather than persist in the ‘mother tongue’. This practice appeared to be quite 
widespread in the classrooms.  
3.6. Poverty and Social Inclusion 
As noted in Section One, direct social exclusion based on gender, religion, ethnicity and 
caste has reduced considerably.77
Scholarships were not thought to have played a very significant role except in boosting the 
enrolment statistics for primary schools. Political parties have now pledged to give 
scholarships to all girls and, since the funds disbursed do not make this possible (typically 
  This was generally confirmed by our field studies 
although the issue remains a concern in parts of the terai. The continuing problem is not 
overt discrimination but the lack of contacts and social skills associated with the classes 
controlling jobs and opportunities. Because of the dominance of ‘informal governance’ it is 
not possible to get a job without connections or by using bribery. This leaves the have-nots, 
especially those from minorities, at a severe disadvantage (see Box below).    
                                                          
77 Sharma, J R and Donini, A (2010) Towards a Great Transformation –the Maoist insurgency and perceptions of 
social transformation in Nepal, Tufts University 
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50% of what is required), schools select the children to receive the scholarship. In many 
cases this is not done according to need but according to influence.   
The public do not necessarily agree with the government’s priorities for dalits and girls. 
Students in one secondary school felt that it was unfair to provide scholarships to some but 
not others when all children lived in similar economic conditions. Government attempts to 
cover other minority groups have led to a very complicated system. In practice SMC Chairs 
often make their own arbitrary decisions how to use the scholarship money. In Dhanusha, 
scholarship money was spent on the purchase of school uniform for all school children. 
Although larger number of girls are enrolling for school their ambitions and educational 
outcomes have not necessarily changed. Social custom has changed to the extent that a 
small amount of education may be an advantage in relation to marriage but it makes no 
other difference in women’s lives. Female students reported that early-age marriage 
remained the main risk to their educational future. Out of 13 girls consulted in a secondary 
school, only two thought they would go to higher secondary school and all expected to be 
married before the age of twenty. Small incentives such as a scholarship may encourage 
enrolment but as soon as girls can work there is pressure for them to marry (and leave 
home) in order to relieve demands on family resources. Under the dowry system, wedding 
expenses become much higher for educated girls. Instead of transforming these practices, 
the education system has simply adapted to them.  
Does education improve opportunities for minority groups? 
My father spent most of his life as a ‘haruwa’ (bonded labour) working for a landlord. He did not 
want me to live the hard life he did so he sent me to school hoping that I would be able to get a job. 
I completed my school and gained a B.Ed. thinking that I would become a teacher. I have also 
obtained teaching licence for both primary and secondary level. Many temporary teaching posts 
come up in different schools but I have no links or political connections. I have tried everywhere but 
it has become impossible to find a job. 
I am the only educated person in my community but I do exactly the same kinds of jobs (manual 
work, farming, daily wage labour work, etc.) that other uneducated people do. So, I am no different 
from other young people who did not complete their school. It feels like I wasted my time by going 
to college. Education has made me more conscious than those who are uneducated in my society 
but economic conditions of my family remain the same and my father still works as a poorly paid 
labourer. So, being educated does not really make me any better.  
Interview, Kapilvastu 
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Section Four: Implications for Development Partners (DPs) 
 
4.1 Overview 
For a summary of PEA findings see the diagram at the end of this Section. 
The Macro-analysis (Section One) indicates that the present fundamental problem of teacher 
deployment is unlikely to change. The politicisation of unions is an integral part of the current 
political situation. Support from teachers is very important to the political parties: calls to de-
politicise education are not wholly realistic. Failure to tackle the teacher deployment issue 
will continue to undermine the quality of government education and increase the divide 
between private and public schools. Remittances from migrants abroad appear likely to 
exacerbate this trend. 
The attempt, endorsed by many DPs, to increase the downward accountability of schools to 
communities will be limited by the parties’ apparent determination to strengthen the 
bureaucracy and control education through their dominance at the centre. Both of these 
extremes (strong central control and vigorous community involvement) are unlikely to come 
about but a combination of better central control of officials (at least to the extent of rooting 
out blatant corruption) and stronger community involvement to improve teacher performance 
may help to make modest improvements.   
On a more positive note, a number of Head Teachers have found ways to operate 
successfully within the system and some SMC Chairs have been able to mobilise local 
funding sources in order to improve and expand the schools. There is a very strong divide 
between the terai, where public education is in an appalling state and the hilly areas where 
conditions are variable but generally acceptable. To an extent the terai is being marginalised 
because too many teachers are located in hilly areas. 
The SSRP and other centrally managed processes in the education sector have little impact 
on schools. This follows the general finding that ‘informal governance’ drives out ‘formal 
governance’. Whatever is envisaged through formal policies and processes is undermined 
by the hidden effects surrounding patronage and politics.  
A second important finding is that bilateral aid, while intended to support ‘formal governance’ 
is distorted towards ‘informal governance’. DP’s have provided substantial funding for public 
education but the outcome is poor because political patronage has not been addressed. 
Arguably, the public education system is run as a source of patronage for the political parties 
and they resist any attempt to set this right. It is questionable whether DPs should continue 
to finance such a system. 
Thirdly, the report indicates that instead of addressing fundamental problems the system is 
capable of adjusting to DP targets by manipulating processes such as exams. Processes are 
being adjusted to give the required results and incentives (often hidden) influence the data. 
Cheating in exams has become institutionalised in order to meet targets set by DPs and 
public expectations. 
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Fourthly, changes in society have reduced the incidence of discrimination along lines of 
identity and led to greater demand for education especially for girls. The education system 
has contributed to this but in a superficial way, through incentives or scholarships, rather 
than through a transformative approach to diversity in the education system. Although 
textbooks have been brought up to date in a post ‘Hindu Kingdom’ era, teachers seem 
unable to teach in a way that challenges long-standing beliefs and social structures. 
Finally, the education system reflects a focus on selfish objectives rather than the good of 
society. From teacher absenteeism to cheating in exams students learn that patronage and 
wealth confer impunity while those from poorer backgrounds are barred from progress.   
4.2. Scope for action 
Unless DPs have access to data that is more reliable than the Flash Reports submitted 
through the education line management they will not even be aware of the problems, let 
alone find solutions. It was a serious mistake for DPs to phase out independent monitoring in 
2007 simply on the basis that in one year (and one year only) the figures from the monitoring 
coincided quite well with those from government. In the previous years the discrepancies 
had been substantial and our study indicates that official statistics continue to be an 
unreliable guide. 
DPs themselves have an interest in positive results. It is gratifying to report that progress is 
being made and perhaps to claim some responsibility for that improvement. The bearer of 
bad news is likely to be blamed, even in aid agencies. This tendency may have been 
exacerbated by the influence of the Paris Declaration of 2005 with its emphasis on 
Alignment with the national government. Nepal is best considered as a Fragile State 
requiring a cautious approach in line with the OECD-DAC Principles.  
DPs should be particularly cautious about promoting any specific agendas on technical 
grounds alone but must take full account of the political context in which debates take place. 
The most sensitive issues relate to federalism and the use of the ‘mother tongue’. 
The Supreme Court has recently delivered a judgment that in order to meet the 
Constitutional requirement of free ‘basic’ education, and taking into account the 
government’s pledge to extend ‘basic’ education through three extra Grades under the 
SSRP, the government must increase spending on education by more than 20%. This has 
led to pressure on DPs to fill the gap. But instead of doing so, DPs should expose the 
enormous inefficiencies of the current system and especially the imbalances in deployment 
of teachers. 
DPs should keep their focus on the issue of deployment of teachers and set in place a 
monitoring system that will enable them to assess the problem more accurately and track 
any progress. DPs may also have to consider dividing their support more evenly between 
the education SWAp and support through NGOs to strengthen local school management 
and encourage a greater level of bottom-up accountability.   
At the same time DPs should relate their funding of the education SWAp to progress towards 
holding elections at VDC and DDC levels. Without elected local bodies the political 
pressures on school management have become unbearable. It is unlikely that any significant 
progress can be made in education until elected local government is re-established. 
A Political Economy Analysis of Education in Nepal 2011 
 
53 
 
In the light of all the above DPs should maintain a broad focus on education and its role in 
society rather than get drawn into a narrow consideration of the SSRP, which ultimately has 
no formal status in law and may be reversed by the new Constitution or by future political 
leadership.  
4.3. Summary of actions requested from the Ministry of Education78
1. Recognising that formal governance is undermined by informal governance, the Ministry 
should recognise the limitations of the civil service and welcome the engagement of non-
government actors in monitoring performance at all levels and providing an independent 
audit; 
 
2. Specifically, the Ministry should cooperate with a DP-led process of independent 
monitoring and use this to check biases that may occur in the formal data; 
3. The Ministry should cooperate with and encourage independent monitoring missions at 
District level, such as groups of journalists, human rights activists, lawyers etc; 
4. At school level the Ministry should welcome the activities of NGOs seeking to improve 
school performance by supporting SMCs and by increasing the participation of students 
and parents in school management; 
5. The Ministry should give special priority to the ‘social audit’ process, ensuring that this 
takes place in a satisfactory manner at least annually; 
6. The Ministry should focus on the issue of teacher deployment and management. As a 
first step, it should develop a national plan in association with the unions to address the 
most extreme cases of imbalance and the general imbalance between schools in hilly 
areas and the terai; 
7. Building on the new national framework of Schools as Zones of Peace, the Ministry 
should seek to develop coalitions of organisations to limit school closures and violence 
especially in the terai; 
8. The Ministry should put its weight firmly behind the case for local elections at VDC and 
DDC levels; 
9. The Ministry should investigate sudden variations in SLC exam pass rates and conduct a 
review of exam practices. 
 
4.4. Summary of Recommendations to DPs 
36. DPs should take every opportunity to challenge ‘informal governance’; 
37. Equip themselves with reliable and independent sources of information; 
38. Insist on the central importance of tackling issues of teacher deployment and 
management; 
39. Insist on elections at VDC and DDC levels as a pre-requisite for their support; 
40. Make full use of independent and NGO channels to monitor, challenge and improve 
public education especially by increasing public participation; 
41. Strengthen efforts to limit violence and school closure (especially in the terai) such as 
Schools as Zones of Peace.   
42. Recognise that the SSRP is only an element (and not a very important one) within the 
wider education system; 
                                                          
78 These proposals are put forward in response to a direct request to do so from the Ministry 
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43. Be cautious in relation to targets and incentives including the MDGs as these can lead to 
distortions and deceptions; 
44. Be cautious in relation to issues such as education charges and instruction in the ‘mother 
tongue’ and modify a technical approach with understanding of political factors; 
45. Commission ongoing research into the exam system in order to identify and eliminate 
irregular practices. 
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PEA DRIVERS 
Centralisation of power and resources 
Politicisation of the education sector and schooling 
Patronage based on political affiliation, social status and wealth  
 
 
Education 
Policy Area 
 
Perceived problems and some 
technical solutions that have been 
suggested  
 
PEA explanation 
 
Questions for DPs 
DEOs Although further resources have been 
devolved to District level, DEOs operate 
under intense pressure from the political 
parties and this is increased because 
elected DDCs and VDCs are lacking. 
DEOs are subject to transfer if they do not 
work with the political entities. This often 
leads to compromise and corruption. 
Particularly in the terai DEOs come under 
threat of violence. DEOs are unable to 
perform their tasks of supervision and 
monitoring. 
The problem lies in the 
centralisation of the 
political parties. DEOs 
have little manoeuvre 
with local political 
agents who are 
directed from 
Kathmandu. These 
agents are not 
susceptible to pressure 
from local 
communities. 
The parties appear to 
favour strengthened 
DEOs and greater 
central control over 
them. DPs should 
counteract this by 
strengthening local 
accountability by 
insisting on VDC and 
DDC elections and by 
strengthening the 
involvement of local 
communities in schools 
 
SMCs  
 
SMCs have significant power over 
resources including school funds and 
appointment of local teachers. The SMC 
is often dominated by the Chair. Technical 
training of the SMC is often seen as the 
answer. 
 
 
The SMC Chair post is 
highly politicised. 
Technical training 
alone may not 
necessarily lead to 
better outcomes. 
Sustained effort to 
mobilise the local 
community may also 
be needed  
 
Elected VDCs and 
DDCs are an essential 
first step. Further 
sustained work at 
school level through 
NGOs may be needed 
to achieve greater 
involvement of the 
community. This sould 
be focused on 
monitoring and social 
audit  
 
Private schools 
 
The high exam pass rate of private 
schools has exposed the weakness of 
public education and should give urgency 
to efforts to address the issue of teacher 
management.  Private school offer better 
job prospects not only through better 
exam results but by offering access to 
elite groups. 
 
Using English as the 
medium of instruction, 
private schools create 
a sharp social divide 
which perpetuates the 
problem of ‘informal 
governance’.  
 
The question why bright 
students from the 
government schools still 
have poor job prospects 
deserves further 
scrutiny. DPs could 
usefully research this 
issue; 
 
Teachers 
 
Permanent teachers cannot be effectively 
managed because of their links with the 
politicised unions. 
 
Political parties are 
unlikely to forego their 
links with teachers 
because these are 
crucial to success in 
elections. 
 
DPs could do further 
research on the 
inefficiencies caused by 
this issue. Arguably, DP 
funding should be 
withheld until it is 
addressed 
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Language of 
instruction 
 
Government has committed to providing 
language of instruction in the mother 
tongue, but there is confusion about what 
this means in practice. The debate is 
complicated by moves towards 
federalism. 
 
 
 
Political populism and 
desire for support from 
ethnic groups has 
given this debate a 
strong political 
character. There are 
strong grounds to 
support the expression 
of diversity but this 
cannot be 
disconnected from 
politics. 
 
DPs should be very 
cautious and recognise 
that technical solutions 
must be modified by an 
understanding of the 
political realities. 
 
Education 
standards and 
examinations  
 
Changes in the rate of SLC pass indicate 
that cheating has become systemic. 
There is a danger that students and 
teachers will conclude that proper study is 
unnecessary.  
 
 
This issue clearly 
demonstrates how 
incentives can distort a 
formal governance 
system. In this case 
the problem is not only 
local bribery but the 
desire of officials to 
meet targets.  
 
DPs should learn that 
targets must be applied 
with caution. This 
applies to the MDGs. 
DPs should maintain a 
broad focus on quality 
education rather than 
allow specific measures 
to dominate.   
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